Financiamento do investimento e do consumo : três ensaios by Mandarino, Gabriel Vieira, 1985-
UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS 
INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA 
 
 
 
 
 
GABRIEL VIEIRA MANDARINO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financing of investment and consumption: three 
essays 
 
 
Financiamento do investimento e do consumo: três 
ensaios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Campinas 
2018 
 
 
UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS 
INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA 
 
 
 
 
 
GABRIEL VIEIRA MANDARINO 
 
 
 
 
Financing of investment and consumption: three 
essays 
 
 
Financiamento do investimento e do consumo: três 
ensaios 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Antonio Carlos Macedo e Silva – orientador 
 
Prof. Dr. Claudio Hamilton Matos dos Santos – co-orientador 
 
 
 
 
Tese de Doutorado apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências 
Econômicas do Instituto de Economia da Universidade Estadual de Campinas para 
obtenção do título de Doutor em Ciências Econômicas, na área de Teoria Econômica. 
 
 
 
ESTE EXEMPLAR CORRESPONDE À VERSÃO 
FINAL DA TESE DEFENDIDA PELO ALUNO 
GABRIEL VIEIRA MANDARINO, ORIENTADA 
PELO PROF. DR. ANTONIO CARLOS MACEDO 
E SILVA E CO-ORIENTADA PELO PROF. DR. 
CLAUDIO HAMILTON MATOS DOS SANTOS. 
 
 
 
Campinas 
2018 
 
 
Agência(s) de fomento e nº(s) de processo(s): CAPES
ORCID:  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6668-2273
Ficha catalográfica
Universidade Estadual de Campinas
Biblioteca do Instituto de Economia
Mirian Clavico Alves - CRB 8/8708
    
  Mandarino, Gabriel Vieira, 1985-  
 M312f ManFinancing of investment and consumption : three essays / Gabriel Vieira
Mandarino. – Campinas, SP : [s.n.], 2018.
 
   
  ManOrientador: Antonio Carlos Macedo e Silva.
  ManCoorientador: Claudio Hamilton Matos dos Santos.
  ManTese (doutorado) – Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de
Economia.
 
    
  Man1. Investimentos. 2. Consumo (Economia). 3. Bancos - Financiamento. I.
Silva, Antonio Carlos Macedo e, 1959-. II. Santos, Claudio Hamilton Matos dos,
1971-. III. Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Instituto de Economia. IV.
Título.
 
Informações para Biblioteca Digital
Título em outro idioma: Financiamento do investimento e do consumo : três ensaios
Palavras-chave em inglês:
Investments
Consumption (Economics)
Banks - Financing
Área de concentração: Teoria Econômica
Titulação: Doutor em Ciências Econômicas
Banca examinadora:
Antonio Carlos Macedo e Silva [Orientador]
Fabio Neves Perácio de Freitas
Franklin Leon Peres Serrano
Laura Barbosa de Carvalho
Marco Antonio Martins da Rocha
Data de defesa: 10-12-2018
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Ciências Econômicas
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS 
INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA 
 
 
 
GABRIEL VIEIRA MANDARINO 
 
 
 
Financing of investment and consumption: three 
essays 
 
 
Financiamento do investimento e do consumo: três 
ensaios 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Antonio Carlos Macedo e Silva – orientador 
 
Prof. Dr. Claudio Hamilton Matos dos Santos – co-orientador 
 
 
Defendida em 10/12/2018 
 
 
COMISSÃO JULGADORA 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Antonio Carlos Macedo e Silva - PRESIDENTE 
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) 
 
Prof. Dr. Fábio Neves Peracio de Freitas 
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) 
 
Prof. Dr. Franklin Leon Peres Serrano 
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) 
 
Prof. Dr. Laura Barbosa de Carvalho 
Universidade de São Paulo (USP) 
 
Prof. Dr. Marco Antonio Martins da Rocha 
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) 
 
A Ata de Defesa, assinada pelos membros 
da Comissão Examinadora, consta no 
processo de vida acadêmica do aluno. 
 
 
A` minha fam´ılia.
Para meus pais, por abrirem
ma˜o de tanto.
Acknowledgement
Sou muito grato ao prof. Antonio. Por ser um pesquisador exemplar, ponderado, sempre
aberto ao dia´logo e consciente de que nossas verdades sa˜o proviso´rias. Pela sensibilidade nos
momentos mais cr´ıticos do doutorado e pela enorme pacieˆncia. Por todos os ensinamentos.
Agradec¸o ao Claudio Hamilton pela persisteˆncia em me orientar, a despeito de alguns des-
encontros (responsabilidade minha). Agradec¸o tambe´m por todos os encontros, seja para me
ensinar a abordagem SFC ou para discutirmos nosso trabalho (via Skype ou e-mail), e pelo
entusiasmo por dialogar conosco. E agradec¸o ao prof. Marc Lavoie por me orientar durante o
per´ıodo em que estive em Paris para o doutorado sandu´ıche.
Agradec¸o aos professores do Instituto de Economia, principalmente aos professores do CE-
CON, onde tive a oportunidade de participar de discusso˜es e de aprender tanta coisa nova.
Muito obrigado aos colegas do CECON por terem sido companhia e por todos os momentos
de descontrac¸a˜o, parte fundamental nesse per´ıodo. Agradec¸o tambe´m aos funciona´rios do In-
stituto que sempre me atenderam com educac¸a˜o e eficeˆncia. Aos professores Lucas Teixeira e
Marco Antonio da Rocha, na˜o apenas pela celeridade na ana´lise da tese para que eu pudesse ser
religado ao programa, mas tambe´m pelas discusso˜es sobre os temas da tese. Agradec¸o tambe´m
ao pessoal da UFRJ, em especial ao Leandro Fagundes, por estar aberto ao dia´logo e por todas
as vezes que me ajudou com meu modelo. Aos professores Fabr´ıcio Pitombo Leite e Ricardo
Summa que aceitaram ler meu projeto de tese quando eu ainda planejava entrar no doutorado.
Agradec¸o aos meus amigos. A L´ıdia e I´talo pela amizade, por todo o apoio com a tese e pela
companhia na Franc¸a. A Camila e Nicholas por me receberem em um per´ıodo cr´ıtico e pela
ajuda com a tese. Ao Luis Ota´vio, Fred e Filippo pela amizade que ja´ dura quinze anos. Ao
Tiago Zortea pelo zelo, por me ensinar a levar o doutorado de maneira mais leve e por mostrar
com sua amizade que ha´ algum sentido nisso tudo. A Ilana por me mostrar que o ambiente de
po´s-graduac¸a˜o pode ser adoecedor, e por me ajudar a mudar minha visa˜o de mim mesmo e a
lidar com meu ambiente de trabalho. Ao Daniel, Camila, Malu e Carol por me receberem por
dois anos e me tratarem como um membro da famı´lia. A Luana, Bruno, Mari e Juju por me
emprestarem sua casa quando eu ja´ estava sem bolsa.
Agradec¸o a CAPES pelo apoio financeiro a` pesquisa e por tornar poss´ıvel o doutorado
sandu´ıche no exterior.
A minha famı´lia, pelo apoio incondicional para que eu pudesse focar nas minhas atividades,
pela enorme pacieˆncia e pelo incentivo. Voceˆs foram fundamentais durante todo o per´ıodo da
po´s-graduac¸a˜o e nada disso seria poss´ıvel sem voceˆs. Na˜o ha´ palavras que expressem de maneira
adequada minha gratida˜o aos meus pais.
Agradec¸o a Bruna por ter entrado na minha vida na parte final do doutorado e por ter sido
minha companheira nesse per´ıodo.
Resumo
Essa tese trata do financiamento do investimento e do consumo, e esta´ dividida em
treˆs cap´ıtulos. O cap´ıtulo 1 discute o financiamento do investimento das empresas
de manufatura com capital aberto no Brasil. O objetivo principal e´ compreender
como essas empresas alteraram a composic¸a˜o do financiamento entre os anos de 2006
e 2015, que compreende o boom da economia brasileira e o in´ıcio de sua queda. Para
cumprir esse objetivo, o cap´ıtulo lida com bases de dados individuais. Ao final do
cap´ıtulo, estima-se um modelo de dados em painel com os principais determinantes
financeiros do investimento. Os cap´ıtulos 2 e 3 apresentam um modelo do super-
multiplicador estruturado a partir da abordagem Stock-Flow Consistent e com o
consumo financiado por cre´dito como o elemento autoˆnomo que lidera o crescimento
econoˆmico. No segundo cap´ıtulo apresenta-se de maneira breve a literatura associ-
ada e, em seguida, o modelo proposto. O terceiro cap´ıtulo busca frasear o modelo
de uma maneira mais intuitiva e, portanto, menos matema´tica. Posteriormente,
sa˜o realizadas simulac¸o˜es nume´ricas para estudar como o modelo reage a choques
exo´genos em diferentes paraˆmetros.
Palavras-chave: financiamento; investmento; supermultiplicador; SFC.
Abstract
This thesis deals with the financing of investment and consumption, and is divided in
three chapters. Chapter 1 refers to the investment finance of manufacturing traded
companies in Brazil. The main objective is to comprehend how these firms managed
the composition of finance between 2006 and 2015, that comprises Brazilian eco-
nomic boom and its fall. To fulfill our objective, we deal with individual databases.
At the end of the chapter, we estimate a panel data model with the main financial
determinants of investment. Chapters 2 and 3 present a supermultiplier SFC model
with consumption financed out of credit as the autonomous component leading eco-
nomic growth. In the second chapter we present the associated literature and the
proposed model. The third chapter phrases it in an intuitive way, linking the main
theoretical elements of the supermultiplier with a description based on financial bal-
ances. Lastly, numerical simulations are realized to study how the model reacts after
exogenous shocks on parameters.
Keywords: financing; investment; supermultiplier; SFC.
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Introduction
Nowadays, it is unanimity among heterodox economists that credit, a source of financing, is
a central subject in the post-Keynesian theory. This consensus, however, is a recent fact. Not
because they disagreed on its importance, but simply because it was not assumed as a potential
determinant of all aggregate demand components. While investment finance is discussed since
Kalecki, the financing of consumption and its implications have become an important topic in
post-Keynesian theory only recently, specially after the recent experience in the USA economy.
Some questions inevitably appear when discussing the financing of any aggregate demand
component, and perhaps the most important ones concern the effect of indebtedness on the
agents’ expenditures decisions and the relation between indebtedness and economic growth.
There are different appropriate perspectives and approaches that could answer these questions.
Here, we try to deal with them with an empirical study focusing on the financing of investment
in Brazil, and with a theoretical discussion about consumption finance.
With regards to the financing of investment, the literature is concerned with the funds
normally used by firms. It seems consensual that internal finance is preferred with respect to
external. Kalecki’s (1937) “increasing risk” principle establishes that the higher the leverage
ratio created to finance investment, the greater the potential fluctuations of earnings net of
interest payments (Lavoie, 2014). For him, retained profits are a fundamental source of finance
because it diminishes firms’ need to raise leverage.
The post-Keynesian pricing theory also emphasizes the importance of internal finance, al-
though it also argues that the choice between internal and external sources depends on the
comparison between implicit (related to internal funds) and explicit interest rates (market’s
rate). Eichner (1976) asserts that investment finance is more related to the generation of profits
and price formation than to the firms’ choice between internal and external finance. In Wood
(1980), retained profit is important as well, but the causality is “reversed”: if nowadays it is
assumed that the amount of internal finance determines investment, in Wood (1980) it is the
planned investment that determines firms’ profit target.
Lastly, Minsky (1980) is straightforward arguing that firms would prefer internal sources,
but that uncertainty about future revenues would force them to rely also on external finance.
Most of the literature dealing with investment financing in Brazil is inspired in the seminal
paper of Fazzari et al. (1988). According to it, the access of firms to capital markets is im-
portant to explain the total amount of funds they have available and, therefore, fluctuations
in investment: if the estimated cash flow coefficient in the investment function is statistically
significant, it implies that the company is restricted in capital markets, and investment is more
susceptible to fluctuations. For that reason, if firms have access to different sources of finance
in capital markets, the importance of internal finance may be reduced.
Empirical studies on investment finance in Brazil are normally based on these theoretical lit-
eratures, that seem to converge about the relative importance of internal finance. Our approach
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in chapter 1 - Financing investment: the case of manufacturing traded companies in Brazil -
is different for a simple reason: our knowledge about the composition of finance in Brazil is
little and divergent, and we believe that this knowledge should precede analysis and hypotheses
concerning the relationship between financing and other variables, such as price formation and
capital markets. Therefore, our proposal aims simply at finding out the composition of funds
that financed investment between 2006 and 2015. The chapter’s objective is to show that in-
vestment finance is an important subject because, given certain conditions, it may constrain
investment in the short run.
We explore different strands of the literature and databases to find out the mix of internal
and external funds to finance investment. Our estimates indicate that retained profits were
at negative levels, increasing the importance of BNDES’ loans during the period. Assuming
that these funds may not have been enough to finance all investment, we search for alternative
funds that could have complemented retained profits and public loans. We suggest that foreign
loans may have been one of them, although lack of appropriate data does not allow a definite
conclusion. Lastly, we estimate a panel data model using the most important funds of our
model.
We demonstrate that there are reasons to believe that financing of investment may constrain
investment in the short run. It is symptomatic that some economists take for granted the finance
of investment, either assuming that retained profits or banking loans always do the job, or relying
excessively on theoretical, macroeconomic approaches. We stress that dealing with investment
financing in an underdeveloped open economy is not trivial, as it is normally assumed. The
Brazilian financial system does not supply long term loans, and the development public bank
(BNDES), the only source of long term funding, has reduced its operations in the past few years.
Lastly, external debt may impose huge financial restrictions to firms if exchange rate devalues.
The discussion concerning financing of consumption and its consequences is more recent,
and emerges as an attempt to explain economic growth processes led by consumption. Despite
some differences, the economies of US and Brazil experienced similar phenomenons: an economic
boom caused by higher debt-financed consumption is followed by sluggish economic performance.
Growth theories are one of the post-Keynesian strands dealing with the effects of consump-
tion financed by credit. One of the literature’s conclusions (normally based on neo-Kaleckian
assumptions) is that an increase in this share of consumption is expansionary in the short run
but contractionary in the long run. Depending on some parameters values, indebtedness may
also increase, even though the “paradox of debt” is also a theoretical possibility.
Pariboni (2016) and Fagundes (2017) use supermultiplier models to analyze economic growth
processes that include debt-financed consumption. Differently from the literature, in these
models indebtedness does not increase after increases in consumption - actually, it decreases.
Supermultiplier models, however, do not deal adequately with financial features of the economy,
and the main objective of chapters 2 and 3 is precisely to build a SFC supermultiplier, given that
the SFC approach “consistently ’integrate’ conventional product and income accounts with ’flow
of funds’ accounts and a full set of balance sheets” (Dos Santos, 2006, p.543). More precisely,
one of the objectives is test whether Pariboni’s (2016) and Fagundes’ (2017) results stand in
a consistent accounting framework that allows dynamic simulations far from the steady state
of the model. We also investigate how workers’ debt-financed consumption affects the financial
balances of other agents in the model.
Therefore, in chapter 2 - “Workers’ debt-financed consumption: a Supermulitplier SFC
model” - we briefly present the theoretical literature dealing with debt-financed consumption in
growth models. The remainder presents the model, beginning with its structural hypothesis.
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We close our model with behavioral hypothesis and from the equations we derive the model’s
dynamic in the short and long runs. In chapter 3, “Exploring and running simulations in the
Supermuliplier SFC model”, we present its main features in an intuitive way, aiming at linking
the main elements of the supermultiplier model and a description based on financial balances.
At the end, we realize numerical simulations to understand the dynamics of the model far from
the steady states.
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Chapter 1
Financing investment: the case of
manufacturing traded companies in
Brazil
“(...) economists should be careful in being overly dogmatic in the theoretical strictures we
impose on our econometric models. Though it may be going too far to advocate ‘letting the
data speak for itself ’ without any theoretical guidance, economists should at least be attentive
to those whispers which the data occasionally emit” (Stiglitz, 1988, p. 122).
1.1 Introduction
The importance of the investment in fixed capital realized by firms in a capitalist economy is
well-known1. However, less evident is the importance of the financing of investment: what funds
are normally used? And how firms manage the composition of financing during an economic
cycle? These questions have not been fully explored. A better comprehension on the financing
of investment is fundamental for macro and microeconomic reasons2.
The paper’s objective is to find out the investment finance composition of manufacturing
traded companies in Brazil between 2006 and 2015. Evidence for the Brazilian economy con-
cerning the financing of investment is little, and yet normally problematic. Cash flow is normally
the only internal fund considered, when evidence indicates that firms manage two or even more
types of internal funds - most papers do not take into account funds such as profit reserves and
short run finance. Finally, as far as we know, there are not attempts to estimate the financing
of investment between 2006 and 2015, period that comprehends the boom and the crisis of
Brazilian economy.
The empirical literature that (indirectly) deals with these questions is the financial restriction
literature, which follows the pioneer work of Fazzari et al. (1988). Frequently based on a large
1See Baddeley’s (2003) book for the main reasons why investments (or the stock of fixed capital) are funda-
mental if the objective is to increase welfare’s society.
2In a monetary economy (and a macroeconomic approach), deposits are only created when one or more
agents increase their liabilities (Seccareccia, 2008), implying that different mix of investment finance may have
different macroeconomic impacts. Additionally, a mix of funds heavily based on loans may lead to unsustainable
trajectories of debt (Minsky, 1986). In a micro level, financing is associated to financial and implicit costs (in
the post-Keynesian theory, the costs associated to raise and retain profits) (Eichner, 1976). More directly, funds
have different (implicit and explicit) costs and risks, and for these reasons the mix of finance is fundamental.
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amount of econometric models, and using cash flow coefficient as a proxy to financial restriction,
the literature’s main objective is to find out whether firms are financially restricted in the capital
markets. If the answer is positive, the conclusion is that investments are affected in a definite
way by the shortage of finance. The solution, thus, would be either the development of capital
markets, or the resolution of informational problems3 between companies and financial agents.
Such an approach, nevertheless, seems inappropriate if one’s objective is to find out firms’
composition of investment finance during an economic cycle. The main reason is that this
literature does not take into account funds that should not be disregarded. Therefore, we
estimate econometric models for investment using as determinants alternative funds that may
have been used by firms between 2006 and 2015. Differently from the financial restriction
literature, that assumes that the composition of finance is affected by firms’ access to low-cost
sources of funds in capital markets, we simply focus on the (internal and external) funds firms
may have available to finance their investments.
In order to reach our main objective, section 1.2 presents available evidence concerning the
finance of investment in other countries and in Brazil. Section 1.3 investigates the case for
Brazilian companies, where we present some estimates for retained earnings and BNDES’ share
on total investments, and discuss different funds that firms may have used to complement the
finance of investments. In section 1.4 we estimate a panel data model, section 1.5 discusses
some theoretical issues on the post-Keynesian approaches to investment finance, and section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Collecting and organizing evidence
In this section we present some evidence in the national and international levels concerning
the financing of investment.
1.2.1 Evidence in the international level
The most recent publications of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment) about investment financing date from 2008 and 2016. Both discuss, among other
topics, the composition of financing around the world, separating firms according to their size.
Here we present only the most recent one4 (table 1.1).
The sources of funds selected by UNCTAD are: internal funds, equity or stock sales, banks,
supplier credit, and other sources. It doesn’t take much to realize that internal funds and banks
represent more than 80% of total finance in all regions. The proportion of internal funds varies
from 62% to 80% of total finance, and the proportion of banking funds ranges between 8% and
25%. Equities, supplier credit and other sources5 represent a small proportion in total finance.
UNCTAD (2016) does not inform what internal funds account for.
Some Brazilian studies in the financial restriction literature seem to assume a principle
relating positively capital market development level and the proportion of external funds on
total finance. Kalatzis et al. (2006, p. 586), for example, say that “(Brazilian) financial system
is not organized to offer long run loans”. Aldrighi and Bisinha (2010, p. 25-6) not only share
3This is the usual hypothesis explaining financial restrictions faced by firms.
4Table 1 is based on a sample of 83608 firms, from 139 countries. Small firms employ 20 workers or less.
Medium-sized firms employ between 20 and 99 workers. Large firms employ more than 99 workers.
5UNCTAD (2016) does not explain what are supplier credit and other sources.
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the same principle, but also claim that financial restriction limits firms’ investments. As a last
example, Oliveira (2014, p. 4) asserts: “Take an emerging economy like Brazil for instance.
Brazil is an important emerging market, with still high levels of capital cost, in which credit
restrictions should play a very important role to explain the investment of firms.” Though we
agree interest rates are relatively high in Brazil and may affect investment decisions, it seems
too precipitate to conclude that high capital costs or eventual shortage of long run loans caused
by an underdeveloped financial system restrict productive investment6.
Table 1.1 does not corroborate this hypothesis. Latin America and Caribbean firms have a
very similar finance composition compared to developed country (OECD countries) firms. The
relative participation of banks in total finance in developed countries (OECD and non-OECD
countries), Latin America and Caribbean firms, and all Asian regions (except for East Asia)
also seems similar, ranging from 14,2% to 20,2%7.
Lastly, it doesn’t seem possible to establish a relationship between firms’ size and banking
funds relative proportion on total finance. Even though small firms finance investment with a
smaller proportion of bank funds compared to medium-sized and large firms, in most regions
medium-sized firms have a larger proportion of bank loans in total finance than large firms.
Regardless of the differences between investment finance composition in the selected regions,
finding definite relationships based on theoretical principles may lead to wrong conclusions.
It seems more reasonable to assume that each region - or even each country - has its own
specificities regarding the relationship between the financial system and firms’ investment finance
composition.
1.2.2 Evidence for the Brazilian economy
UNCTAD (2008), Almeida et al. (2013) and CEMEC (2016) are the only estimates (that
we are aware of) regarding the financing of investment in Brazil. Rezende (2016) also discusses
the subject, even though he doesn’t estimate relative participations of funds in total finance.
UNCTAD’s (2008) evidence (table 1.2) indicate an average relative share of 56,3% of retained
earnings in total finance, followed by banking funds (local and foreign-owned commercial banks)
- 14,3% -, trade credit - 8,7% - and public banking funds - 8,5%. The source of funds “Others”8
represented 6,7% of total investment finance.
Almeida et al. (2013) utilized a sample of 104 large manufacturing firms between 2004 and
2007, and 2008 (table 1.3). They evaluate that between 2004 and 2007 retained earnings financed
51% of total investment, and long run debt financed 41%. Long run debt are composed of long
run finance (12,4 p.p.), long run debentures (1,1 p.p.) and other sources (23,5 p.p.). BNDES’
long-term loans financed only 4,5% of total investment in the period. In 2008, retained earnings
relative participation fell to 25% in total finance, and forced companies to complete it with
funds such as long run debt - that increased its share to almost 60% - and equities - 15,7%.
BNDES’ funds increased 2,2 p.p, reaching 6,7% in financing composition.
The second remark is about what the authors call “Other sources”, that represent 1/4 of total
finance - only retained earnings have a larger share on total finance composition. According to
the authors, it includes short run banking (and non-banking) loans and financial commitments
with clients and suppliers. The lack of such important information may prevent a more precise
6The last column in Figure 1.1 shows that the proportion of firms that identify access to finance as a major
constraint (except for firms in Africa in West Asia) is no more than 30%.
7Considering all firms.
8This source contains internal and external funds.
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Table 1.1: Firms’ sources of investment finance by size of firms 2008-2015
Source: UNCTAD (2016).
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Table 1.2: Firms’ sources of investment finance by size of firms in Brazil - 2003
Source: UNCTAD (2008).
Table 1.3: Financing composition (%) - 2004-2007 and 2008
Source: Almeida et al. (2013).
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Figure 1.1: Firms’ investment finance (%)
Source: CEMEC (2016).
comprehension of the way firms managed internal and external funds, especially during the crisis
of 2008.
The objective of CEMEC’s (2016) publications is to evaluate the trajectories of the main
sources of finance in the Brazilian economy (firms’ and households’ investments). However,
CEMEC (2016) only assumes that the most important funds - such as retained earnings, foreign
direct investment and others - are financing investment, which may not always be true. Still,
CEMEC’s (2016) estimates are useful to observe some tendencies in the recent years.
As shown in figure 1.1, retained earnings decreased its share during the period, increasing
the relative importance of other funds specially after 2012. BNDES’ funds, foreign direct invest-
ment and external debt substituted retained earnings, whereas capital markets kept its relative
participation much the same (although with variations in the period). CEMEC’s evidence in-
dicates, following Almeida et al. (2013), that firms had to adjust the mix of funds in order to
finance all investment.
Rezende (2016) does not estimate the finance composition, but tries to comprehend the
effects of investment finance on firms’ balance sheets. He sustains that “during the boom years,
a large share of investment was financed by enterprise internally generated funds compared to
the use of external funds. As the expansion got underway, firms were willing to increase the
use of external funds to finance investment, which led to riskier financial profiles and declining
cushions of safety (...) The combination between declining internally-generated funds and rising
local and foreign borrowings changed the composition of investment financing and deteriorated
financial profiles” (Rezende, 2016, p. 38).
Rezende (2016) explains that while retained earnings declined sharply, firms’ expenditures
in fixed capital remained in a relatively high level, high enough to exceed internally generated
funds and to compel firms to use borrowed funds.
The fall in retained earnings that led to record lows in 2012 is explained by the decrease in
the aggregate corporations’ profits and the higher dividend payments. Without enough internal
funds, firms had to increase their demand for external funds. The expansion of the non-financial
corporations’ indebtedness relative to gross operating surplus reflects that need: from 128% in
2007 to 209% in June 2013. Firms resorted to BNDES’ loans (with lower costs) and foreign
borrowing, improving debt maturity and lowering average interest rate paid. Rezende (2016)
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argues that “BNDES’ policies prevented firms that were still in the speculative stage from
shifting to Ponzi positions and contributed to lower the supply price of capital” (Rezende, 2016,
p. 39). Nevertheless, according to Rezende (2016), firms found themselves in a worst situation
in 2015 than that in the period until 2008, when investments were mostly financed with retained
earnings.
We can draw some conclusions from the evidence presented. According to UNCTAD (2008)
and Almeida et al. (2013), the most important sources of finance in Brazil are internal funds
and debt, provided either by commercial or public banks. Rezende (2016) states that firms had
to rely on local (BNDES’ lending) and foreign debts, but such as CEMEC (2016), he doesn’t
estimate relative participations of each fund in total finance. We base our econometric models
on this consensus concerning retained profits and long-term loans.
Another important element is the lack of convergence about the funds used to complement
retained earnings and long-term debt. In Almeida et al. (2013), 1/4 of total finance was
described as “Other items”, which is an important relative share. In UNCTAD (2008; 2016),
the items “Others” are relatively small.
1.2.3 Financial restriction literature
The financial restriction literature was influenced by the discussion initiated in the 1950s
about the relevance of firms’ financial structure. Financial variables (partially) determined
investment in the first investment models9, but Modigliani and Miller (1958) established, in
theoretical bases (and under certain conditions such as perfect competition, total access to
information and no transactions costs), the irrelevance of financial structure to the investment
decisions (Fazzari et al., 1988). In other words, after Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) paper,
financial and real decisions became independent.
Their approach was further adopted by neoclassical economists working on productive in-
vestment10, and one of their most important outcomes is that only real variables - such as
quantities and relative prices - were determinants of investment. Financial variables were con-
sidered irrelevant to investment decision.
Interestingly, after Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) paper economists were more determined
to explore the relationships between financial structure and firms’ real decisions. As Stiglitz
(1988, p. 121) wrote, “Indeed, it is ironic that a paper which purportedly established that one
need not pay attention to financial structure - that financial structure was irrelevant - should
have focused economists’ attention on finance.”
Financial restriction literature, therefore, emerges as a critic to neoclassical investment mod-
els. Rejecting the representative agent hypothesis11, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) -
FHP hereafter - classify firms a priori12 according to profit retention practices, which in turn
are determined by dividends distribution.
9Meyer and Kuh (1957), Duesenberry (1958) and Kuh and Meyer (1963) associated financial variables and
productive investment.
10Jorgenson (1967).
11According to the authors, neoclassical models with representative firms, in which financial structures are
irrelevant to the investment decisions, may apply to mature companies, for they could substitute internal funds
for external ones. But in the case of smaller firms, financially restricted, neoclassical model would not be
appropriate.
12FHP’s classification divides firms in three groups. Class 1 firms have a ratio of dividends to income less than
0,1. Class 2 firms have a ratio dividend to income between 0,1 and 0,2. Class 3 firms includes all other firms.
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According to the authors, this classification would be appropriate to identify firms with larger
relative external costs, caused by financial restriction. The key idea is: firms that retain more
profits (or pay less dividends) are financially restricted in capital markets. The implication is
that these firms’ investments are expected to be more sensitive to cash flow13 variations. In their
econometric model, it means cash flow coefficients are expected to be positive and statistically
significant. In the same way, firms with lower retention rates would have low-cost sources of
finance, and finance composition would be irrelevant14. In that case, cash flow coefficient is
expected to be positive but statistically non-significant.
FHP assume that financial restrictions would be caused by capital market imperfections,
explained by transactions costs, tax advantages, agency problems, financial costs and principally
asymmetric information between managers and creditors, or potential investors. Asymmetric
information issues would be greater for firms that pay low dividends. FHP’s hypothesis - that
imperfections in capital market would determine financial restrictions - links firms’ financial
structure and investment decisions, for capital markets imperfections would restrain firms’ access
to funds, leading them to surpass that restraint by generating internal funds to finance a share
of total investment.
The financial restriction literature in Brazil15 is responsible for the estimation of most of
the available investment finance models. However, its main objective is not to comprehend
investment finance composition16, but to assess if firms are financially restricted in capital
markets. For this reason, we only present the main features of those models. Investment is
normally proxied by fixed asset variation or CAPEX17, while the most adopted determinants
are proxies for: a) financial restriction, associated with availability of internal funds (cash flow
or operational revenues), b) cost of credit (interest rate), c) investment opportunities (Tobin’s
q), d) indebtedness (total debt or long run finance) and e) demand (sales). Companies are
discriminated in different ways to evaluate financial constraints, according to their size, amount
of distributed dividends, indebtedness or debt burden. Techniques used also vary: fixed and
random effect, GMM (generalize method of moments), bayesian, GLS (generalized least square),
OLS (ordinary least square).
13Cash flow is determined as the sum of net profits, depreciation and amortization.
14“If the cost disadvantage is significant, firms that retain and invest most of their income may have no low-cost
source of investment finance, and their investment should be driven by fluctuations in cash flow” (Fazzari et al.,
1988, p. 142).
15Lopes (2001) analyzes financial restriction in an investment accelerator model. Casagrande (2002) and
Casagrande and Sartoris (2011, p. 522) consider working capital a better proxy for firms’ liquidity than cash
flow: “Besides the accumulation of profit, firms can manipulate items from the asset or the liability side in order
to alter the working capital, the variable that better represents firms’ liquidity”. They don’t divide companies
in restricted and non-restricted. Filho (2005) uses working capital as a proxy to firms’ financial restriction,
and cash flow would represent investment opportunities. Terra (2003), Kalatzis et al. (2006) and Casagrande
and Sartoris (2011) add lagged investment as a determinant variable, estimating a dynamic model. Hamburger
(2011), Kalatzis et al. (2006) and Casagrande and Sartoris (2011) models contain a variable representing private
long run finance, while Oliveira (2014) is the only one to include BNDES’ loans. Kirch et al. (2014) estimate
dummies combining cash flow with financial indicators, such as assets tangibility.
16With the probable exception for Casagrande and Sartoris’ (2011) paper. One of the relevant aspects of the
paper is that internal funds are not reduced to cash flows, for they consider working capital variations as an
internal alternative fund.
17Net acquisition of permanent assets.
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1.3 How manufacturing companies have composed in-
vestment finance in Brazil?
In this section we investigate the funds publicly traded manufacturing companies may have
used to finance investment between 2006 and 201518. This period includes the boom and the
downturn of investments in Brazil19, allowing the observation of firms’ investment finance in
different moments of Brazilian economic cycle. Econometric estimates also benefit from this
variability.
1.3.1 Data descriptive analysis
Our sample is composed of 104 publicly traded manufacturing20 companies, registered at
the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil (CVM). Economatica is the main database,
from where balance sheet and income statement data were extracted. In the case of the former,
data comprises information from January to December, while the later consists of information
extracted at the last day (the 31th) of each year. All data is in real terms21.
We also collected data for BNDES’ loans22 for each company, taken from BNDES’ website.
BNDES’ operations regarding the finance of investment are non-automatic direct and indirect
and automatic indirect23 (figures 1.2a and 1.2b). We included all firms’ operations24 with
BNDES between 2006 and 2015.
18Lack of data before 2006 does not allow an analysis of a longer period.
19About the GFCF dynamic in Brazil from 2004 to 2012, Dos Santos (2013). Orair (2015) discusses Brazilian
government investments. Miguez (2016) is the most important reference concerning GFCF in Brazil, with special
attention to industrial sectoral investments.
20Manufacturing companies classified by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The
sample includes companies from different industries: food and drinks, home appliances, industrial machines
and equipments, paper and cellulose, minerals, petroleum, chemistry and steel, textile and vehicles and parts
(according to Economatica’s classification). It does not include Petrobra´s.
21Adjusted real data is based on IPCA index.
22All the information used is available at BNDES’ website. Since BNDES is a public bank, informations should
be open to the public. We made a request asking for BNDES’ share on each company’s investment project, but
our demand was denied: “(...) a informac¸a˜o sobre o valor total de cada projeto na˜o esta´ sistematizada e, em
func¸a˜o do seu volume, este levantamento acarretaria trabalho adicional de ana´lise e consolidac¸a˜o de dados,
conforme art 13, III, do Decreto 7.724/2012, que regulamenta a Lei de Acesso a` Informac¸a˜o. Por este motivo,
a informac¸a˜o sobre o percentual do projeto apoiado pelo BNDES tambe´m na˜o pode ser fornecida” (Protocol
number 99903000637201665).
23Automatic indirect operations don’t need BNDES’ previous approval and their values are not higher than R$
20 million. They finance fixed capital, as well researches and innovations. Machines and equipment finance are
realized through automatic indirect operations - through BNDES’ products BNDES Finame and BNDES Card.
Investment projects are realized through BNDES Automatic. Non-automatic direct and indirect operations
demand previous approval from BNDES, and they are direct when there are no intermediaries between firms
and the public bank (direct operations are always non-automatic, because they need the bank’s approval). Both
attend to demands higher than R$ 20 million, and direct operations are realized through BNDES Finem.
24There are operations with different amortization periods (including those with less than one year) and
financing different kinds of projects other than with productive purposes - e.g. sectoral positioning. We decided
to include all of them in our database instead of making a selection based on theoretical or accounting purposes.
27
Table 1.4: Relative weight of sample on GDP
Source: Economatica and IBGE.
Figure 1.2: BNDES operations (in R$ millions)
(a) Direct and indirect non automatic operations
Source: BNDES.
(b) Indirect automatic operations
Source: BNDES.
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1.3.2 Estimates of the investment finance composition
Retained profits25 and BNDES’ loans26,27 are two of the most important sources of invest-
ment finance in Brazil. We suggest that BNDES’ loans were fundamental because a) companies
may have faced difficulties to rely on retained profits28 during most of the period, and b) they
“lowered firms’ interest payments, in spite of their rising leverage”, as argued by Rezende (2016,
p. 39).
Figure 1.3 shows that investment29 increases during the first half of the period, falling in
the second half. BNDES’ loans were a constant source of finance, and its relative importance
increases with the fall of retained profits.
There are three reasons for the fall in retained profits (figure 1.4). The first one is the
decrease of operational and financial profits, specially from 2011 on. The second is the increase
of depreciation, and the last one is a marked increase of distributed dividends30 from 2013 to
2015 - as pointed out by Rezende (2016). These elements explain the increasing negative values
for retained profits from 2011 on, and also highlights the importance of BNDES in this context.
Assuming our estimates are somewhat close to the facts31 and given that i) our estimates of
retained profits are negative and ii) not all companies relied on BNDES’ loans32, we suggest that
some of them may have resorted on alternative funds to finance investment - reminding that
Almeida’s et al. (2013) estimates account for almost 25% of total finance as“other resources” for
the period between 2004 and 2007. Accordingly, four possibilities are considered, two internal
funds and two external to companies: profit reserves, working capital variation, short run loans
and foreign borrowing.
We discard private banks’ funds as an alternative to investment finance. Despite the fact
25Retained profits = operational profit + financial profit - dividends - depreciation.
26The main reason for considering initially only retained profits and BNDES’ loans is that these two funds
represent most part of finance estimates in the literature explored in section 1.2.
27BNDES’ loans were deflated by an index created from gross fixed capital formation data in Brazil (IBGE).
28Relatively low values for retained profits may be explained by the fact that depreciation includes amortization
values. Economatica does not provide separate data for these variables. Additionally, our negative estimates for
retained profits are in accordance with Rezende (2016, p. 32), that based on IBGE database, shows that non
financial companies in Brazil are net debtor since 2007: “The corporate sector balance declined from 1.2% of
GDP in 2006 to -2.9% of GDP in 2013”.
29Investment is proxied by fixed asset variation. Fixed assets include, in addition to machinery and equipment,
lands, buildings and vehicles. Literature also adopts CAPEX, an indicator representing the net acquisition of
permanent assets, but it also includes ativos imobilizados, investimentos e ativo diferidos, investments that are
not directly related to productive capacity.
30Financialisation literature asserts that the increase of investments in financial assets realized by non-financial
corporations and the higher amounts of distributed dividends are responsible for the reduction of investment rates
since the 80’s (Stockhammer, 2009). In a certain way, financialization literature’s main hypothesis is not different
from financial restriction literature’s one. Both argue that investments are restricted by finance, and without
that restraint investments ratios would be higher. That is a long and controversial debate, but for different
reasons we do not assume that investments are determined only by finance. It seems more prudent to state that
the fall of internal funds cause a change in balance sheets, for firms rely more on external finance. Kliman and
Williams (2015) present convincing arguments and data against the idea that investments are restricted by the
availability of internal funds.
31A few important remarks must be done. Our estimates for retained earnings are negative in eight out of ten
years, and certainly lower than all evidence presented in subsection 2. We remind that UNCTAD’s estimates
account for the sum of retained funds and other internal funds (which we do not know), while our estimates
account only for retained earnings. Another reason for this difference might be the different periods selected:
ours comprehend one of the most important crisis in Brazilian economic history, that certainly reflects on net
profits indicators.
3263 out of 104 companies had at least one operation with BNDES during the period.
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Figure 1.3: Investment, retained profits and BNDES’ loans (in R$ millions)
Source: Economatica. Author’s elaboration. Left-hand axis associated
to investments.
Figure 1.4: Components of retained profits (in R$ millions)
Source: Economatica. Author’s elaboration. Right-hand axis associated
to dividends.
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Table 1.5: Loans maturity of the five biggest banks in Brazil
Source: Central Bank of Brazil (BCB).
Table 1.6: Possible alternative funds (share on total liabilities)
Source: Economatica. Author’s elaboration. Liabilities = short-term liabilities
+ long-term liabilities.
there are not specific data accounting for private funds share on total investment finance33, we
know from table 1.5 that private banks’ share on loans maturity between 1081 and 1800 days,
and between 1801 and 5400 days is relatively small34, if compared to the participation of public
banks (Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econoˆmica Federal).
Profit reserves
Legally, companies may count on profit reserves to finance firms’ investments. From 2011
to 2015 profit reserves variations were negative, suggesting that firms may have used them to
complement investment finance35.
33Economatica’s database contains the item “Total long run loans and financing”, but does not distinguish it
into private or public loans.
34And it may be even smaller, because according to Grimaldi and Madeira (2016), BNDES funding is registered
in the private banks’ balance sheet. According to the Central Bank of Brazil, in 2015 only 20% of the domestic
funds available for legal person had maturity equal or higher than five years. Around 90% of these long-term
funds are public banks assets - 53% belongs to BNDES (Grimaldi and Madeira, 2016).
35Profit reserves attend to several objectives (Iud´ıcibus et al., 2010). One of them is to smooth financial losses,
and since net profit fell sharply in the second half of the period, it is reasonable to assume firms used those
reserves to cover them. Since Economatica database doesn’t divide profit reserves item into different categories,
we cannot know whether firms used them to finance investments. Our econometric estimates may help with this
task.
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Working capital variation
Casagrande and Sartoris (2011) state that working capital is the most liquid group in firms’
balance sheets. We calculate working capital subtracting current liabilities from current assets,
and the working capital variation making working capital (t) - working capital (t − 1). When
working capital variation is positive, companies are investing in current assets, and liquidity
falls. When working capital variation is negative, either they are getting rid of current assets
or increasing current liabilities - in either case, liquidity raises.
In theoretical terms, working capital and investments are competing for the same funds, but
it may also be that working capital supplies funds to finance investments, when firms cannot
count on retained earnings only (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Hall and Kruiniger, 1995). That is
why, in an investment model, the working capital coefficient sign might be positive or negative:
if it is positive, profits were more than enough to finance fixed investments, and companies used
it to buy assets or to pay debts; if it is negative, profits weren’t enough to finance investments in
fixed capital, and internal funds were created through the management of the working capital.
Arguing that working capital might be useful to smooth fixed investment relative to cash
flow shocks (in case firms face finance constraints), and estimating an investment model with
Tobin’s q, cash flow and working capital as determinants, Fazzari and Petersen (1993) conclude
that working capital is an important source of funds (instead of a use of funds), and that it is
“excessively sensitive” to cash flow fluctuations, suggesting again that firms may manage it when
profits fall. Hall and Kruiginer’s (1995) objective is to find out if working capital’s function is to
smooth investments or to allow firms getting lower cost loans (since banks would consider firms’
working capital before deciding to lend them money), but their results do not permit them to
draw definite conclusions.
Our data seems to indicate working capital as an important source of funds in the second
half of the period, when working capital variation was negative in four years (table 1.6).
Short run loans
Almeida et al. (2013) suggest that short run finance may have financed investment between
2004 and 2007. UNCTAD’s (2008, 2016) estimates also account for an item called “Others”,
that could represent short run finance.
Foreign borrowing
According to Rezende (2016), Almeida et al. (2016), CEMEC (2016) and Correˆa et al.
(2017), foreign borrowing increased its relative share on firms’ liabilities between 2006 and
201536, representing more fragile financial positions, larger amounts of interest expenses and
depressing profitability. Our data shows a relative increase of long-term finance on liabilities37,38
(table 1.6). Nevertheless, Economatica’s data might be misleading39.
36Long term external debt (that includes bonds, loans and commercial credit) of non-financial firms in Brazil
ranged from US$ 55,6 bi in 2006 to US$ 111,9 bi in 2015 (Central Bank of Brazil, 2018).
37From 104 firms, 76 provided data concerning foreign debt, and 35 presented values different from zero.
38Economatica’s database provide data from 2010 to 2015.
39According to an authorized person at Economatica, companies are not obliged to publicly announce their
values concerning the origin of long-term loans. Therefore, since the sum of long-term local financing and long-
term foreign financing is different from total long-term financing (this one of obligatory announce), we infer some
companies did not announce their values.
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1.4 Panel data model
In this section, we estimate an investment function including as determinants retained profits,
BNDES’ non automatic and automatic operations, and sales (proxied by revenues). Retained
profits and loans represent most part of investment financing in Brazil, as presented in section
1.2. BNDES’ operations are divided into direct and indirect non automatic operations and
indirect automatic operactions. Despite the fact sales are not directly related to the finance of
investment, incorporating it represents the inclusion of the accelerator principle in the model40.
We do not include any proxy for borrowing costs, such as interest rate41.
The estimated equation is:
Iit
TA
= β1 + β2
RPit
TA
+ β3
BNDES.nonautit
TA
+ β4
BNDES.autit
TA
+ β5
Rit−1
TA
+ βi + βt + it (1.1)
where Iit represents investment, RPit retained profits, BNDES.nonautit and BNDES.autit the
direct and indirect non automatic and indirect automatic operations of BNDES, respectively,
Rit−1 lagged revenue (proxy for sales), βt represents dummies for each year and βi controls for
each sector .
The sample consists of 104 Brazilian companies from manufacturing sector, forming an
unbalanced panel42 with 1040 observations. One important advantage of panel data is that it
controls for individual heterogeneity, diminishing the risk of biased results. Panel data also“give
more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of
freedom and more efficiency” (Baltagi, 2005, p. 5).
We used the fixed effects (FE) model, controlling for sector and year. Fixed effects models
capture unobservable, firm-specific factors, assuming these omitted factors are fixed parameters
to be estimated. According to Baltagi (2005), this model is appropriate when focusing on a
specific set of N firms. Random effects models could also be used, but Hausman test pointed
to the consistency of fixed effects model.
After some adjustments in the sample, table 1.7 presents the results43,44.
According to our estimates, coefficients of retained profits and BNDES’ direct and indirect
non automatic operations are positive and statistically significant. Indirect automatic operations
and sales were not significant. Our model confirms the importance of BNDES’ operations during
a period in which firms accumulated deficits and negative retained profits.
It is important to remark that, differently from the financial restriction literature, the sta-
tistical significance of retained earnings coefficient does not necessarily imply that firms are
40Other sources such as equities (UNCTAD, 2008; Almeida et al., 2013) and debentures (Almeida et al., 2013)
do not seem to play an important role. According to CVM, in 2016 only 3,4% of debentures funds financed fixed
capital. As already discussed, private commercial banks are funded by BNDES and, therefore, not included in
our model.
41From a survey completed by around 600 to 900 US companies, Sharpe and Suarez (2015, p. 2-3) conclude
not only that investment plans are insensitive to changes in the interest rates (borrowing costs), but also that
this insensitivity was due to the fact that internal funds may be complemented by cash reserves and that “firm’s
investment was based largely on product demand or long-term plans rather than on current interest rates.”
42According to Baltagi (2005), panels are considered unbalanced when individuals are not observed over the
entire sample period.
43Due to the presence of outliers, we excluded 12 observations for investment and retained profits that were
out of the range defined by the criteria: average +/- 2*(standard deviation).
44Coefficients standard-errors are calculated based on the grouped residuals for each company, and for this
reason, they are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the models.
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Table 1.7: Fixed effect model for investment finance. Period: 2006-2015
Source: author’s elaboration. Estimated t statistics in parentheses. *Statisti-
cally significant at 1%. **Statistically significant at 5%. aFixed effects; firms’
and years’ specific effects not reported.
financially restricted - or, in other words, that they cannot substitute internal funds for external
ones. Our estimates only suggest that retained profits are an important source of funds.
We include four different variables in our baseline model to test whether at least one of them
complemented the financing of investment: the stocks of short run finance, long-term foreign
finance and profit reserves45, and working capital variation. When including long-term foreign
debt, the period considered was 2010-2015, for lack of data. We used fixed the effect model
in three specifications (short run finance, long-term foreign finance and profit reserves) and
the two-stage least squares model (2SLS) when we included working capital, for it deals with
endogeneity using instrumental variables (IV). If changes in working capital are related to fixed
capital investment decisions, they are endogenous, and endogeneity may cause inconsistencies
of OLS estimates. Following Fazzari and Petersen (1993), the instruments are cash flow, stock
of working capital and dummies for year and company46.
As described in table 1.8, all variables are statistically insignificant with exception of short
run finance - however, its coefficient is negative. We suggest some reasons for these results.
Working capital may have financed investment in specific years (2012 and 2015), when firms
created liquidity. Also, profit reserves serve to different objectives: according to Iud´ıcibus et
al. (2010), there are seven different destinations to profit reserves, which includes including
legal reserves (used to cover financial loses) and contingency reserves (used to cover eventual
future fall in profits). Therefore, firms might have used reserves to stabilize rentability, and not
to finance investment. As argued, estimates of foreign finance coefficient should be seen with
precaution, for Economatica’ database may be incomplete. Despite this limitation, the evidence
presented suggests that foreign finance may have played a role in the financing of investment.
45Profit reserves, retained earnings and sales have relatively low correlation values: 0.093 for the correlation
between profit reserves and retained earnings, 0.106 between retained earnings and sales, and 0.082 between
sales and profit reserves.
46We do not control for Tobin’s q, though.
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Table 1.8: Alternative models for investment finance. Period: 2006-2015
Source: author’s elaboration. Estimated t statistics in parentheses. *Statis-
tically significant at 1%. **Statistically significant at 5%. ***Statistically
significant at 10%. a,bFixed effects (FE) and two-stage least squares (2LSL);
firms’ and years’ specific effects not reported.
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1.5 Brief theoretical notes
One could argue that the finance of investment - at least internal finance - might not be a
problem in the long run since, according to Kalecki’s profit equation, Investment = Profit, or
“capitalists get what they spend”. Even though this causality may solve the problem of internal
finance of investment in the long run (what is not necessarily true for many reasons, being one
of them the fact that machinery may be imported), in the medium-run it may happen that
investments and profits are different in a relevant way. In that case, firms would count on
external funds to finance investments.
By insisting on the importance of investment finance composition, we do not imply that
firms never face financial restrictions. We would rather say their access to low cost external
funds depends on some factors, in which the firm’s size47 and the specificities of local financial
systems may be two of the most important ones.
Heterodox theories focus on different aspects of the finance of investment. Minsky (1986)
sheds light on the mix of firms’ internal and external funds, associating it with the supplier credit
side (capital market) and with the potential instability that might arise from these interrelation-
ships. About the firms’ decision on the investment finance composition, Minsky (1986) seems
to believe that they always prefer to use internal funds than cash and liquid assets or external
funds , and that uncertainty about cash flows that arises from the employment of new capital
goods (profits) forces firms to resort on external finance48: “This element of uncertainty centers
on the mix of internal and external financing that will be needed; this mix depends upon the
extent to which finance for the investment goods will be forthcoming from profit flows” (Minsky,
1986, p. 207). At the same time, Minsky states that when firms need to rely on external funds,
financial costs matter in investment decisions: “In determining whether an investment project is
worth undertaking, anticipated cash flows are compared with the cost of the project” (Minsky,
1986, p. 212). So, in terms of funds preferred by firms, retained earnings would be the first
option, and external funds would complement them - the external fund used would depend on
its financial cost.
Minsky (1986) seems to forget that retained earnings also have implicit costs. Or, in other
words, firms face dilemmas if they intend to increase internal funds. Therefore, costs of internal
funds may be higher or lower than costs of external ones - and if that is the case, one cannot
say retained earnings are preferred to other funds.
The idea that retained earnings have implicit costs comes from the post-Keynesian pricing
theory. This literature (Kaldor, 1966; Kregel, 1973; Eichner, 1976; Harcourt and Kenyon, 1976;
Wood, 1980) stresses that investment finance is associated as much to generation of profits in
the economic system and to price formation than to the choice of funds49. Rising prices - to
attend oligopolistic companies’ demand to finance investment - could cause the entry of new
companies in the sector, or losing market share, or even government intervention (if it assumes
higher prices are abusive to society). Conceding that raising prices impose not only positive
effects - more internal funds - but also negative impacts to companies, it is possible to calculate
an implicit interest rate on these internal funds. So, price decision aiming the generation of
47Evidenced by financial restriction literature and UNCTAD’s (2016) estimates to different firms’ size.
48Minsky (1986) argues that cash and liquid assets, internal and external funds are the three sources of funds
normally used to finance investment.
49“Thus, the pricing decision in an oligopolistic industry is intimately bound up with the capital accumulation
process. This linking of price level to the industry’s investment program is, in fact, the single most important
feature of the pricing model set forth below” (Eichner, 1976, p. 56).
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internal funds would depend on a comparison between implicit interest rate and market rates.
Despite the fact post-Keynesian pricing theory is right on focusing on sectoral conditions
when dealing with investment finance, apparently it incurs in two fallacies of composition.
One of them is that the variation of mark-up rate implies in a variation of the profit share and,
consequently, of the wage share. Altering the composition - and eventually the size - of aggregate
demand may alter companies’ revenues and, consequently, their (retained) profits. In other
words, it is not trivial to assume that changes in the mark-up rate will generate the expected
internal funds for they change income distribution. The other fallacy is that modifying the
mark-up rate in one sector implies different relative costs of sectors that demand its production
inputs. Different relative costs may cause modifications on the production methods, altering
the capital/labor ratio and, therefore, total aggregate demand.
We believe the flaws discussed above represent valid reasons for not using those theories as
frameworks for empirical analyses related to the composition of investment finance. We also
believe there is a lack of consistent heterodox theories discussing the subject, but it seems that
the post-Keynesian pricing theory points to important directions for focusing on i) sectoral
conditions to generate and retain profits, and ii) the possibility of composing finance with
external funds through comparisons between the implicit interest rate and the market rate.
1.6 Conclusions
Our main objective is to find out the funds that composed the investment finance of 104
Brazilian manufacturing companies from 2006 to 2015. Previous estimates could not adequately
deal with this objective for some reasons. The financial restriction literature estimates most of
investment models including financial determinants, but emphasizing that it aims at assessing
whether companies are financially restricted in capital markets. Therefore, estimates do not
take into account alternative funds that could be used by firms, such as profit reserves and
working capital. Finally, the period between 2006 and 2015 comprehends the boom and the
crisis of Brazilian economy, extending the period analyzed in Almeida et al. (2013).
As our estimates indicate, companies could not rely on retained profits because they were
negative most of the period, due to the fall in operational and financial profits and increases in
depreciation and dividend payments, specially after 2012. In this context, BNDES’ operations
were fundamental, supplying long-term funds at lower costs.
We assumed four sources of funds could have been alternatives to retained profits and BN-
DES’ loans: profit reserves, working capital, short run finance and long run foreign finance.
Profit reserves is a balance sheet item, and surprisingly (because the financing of investment is
one of its legal functions) literature doesn’t mention it as an alternative source of funds. From
2011 to 2015 profit reserves variations were negative, indicating firms might have used it to
complement investment finance. Assuming working capital as an alternative means not only
recognizing it as a source of funds, but also that firms face a dilemma regarding the temporal
character of investment decisions - making working capital both a source and a destination of
funds. Four years of working capital negative variation could suggest firms appealed to short-
term liquidity. Foreign borrowing is pointed out as an alternative (Almeida et al., 2016; Rezende,
2016), as also demonstrated by Economatica’ database. However, companies are not obliged to
supply this information to Economatica, and data may be incomplete. Almeida et al. (2013)
suggest that short run finance may have financed investment between 2004 and 2007.
Our econometric model shows that retained profits and BNDES’ direct and indirect non
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automatic operations are the most relevant variables explaining investment in the period (even
though our estimates of retained profits were negative in eight out of ten years): while the
former is statistically significant in all specifications, BNDES’ non automatic operations is not
significant when we include long-term foreign finance. Indirect automatic operations and sales
do not seem relevant to explain investment in the period.
Alternative internal funds also seemed to be irrelevant. However, we insist that capturing
statistical effects of alternative internal funds might be a difficult task, since firms may need
them in specific years. Additionally, we have demonstrated that private banks are unimportant
to investment finance because their loans are funded by BNDES. This is also the case for
debentures.
The major problem of our econometric model is that it necessarily has to deal with financing
as a constraint to investment during all the period, what is not necessarily true, specially from
2011 - when investment falls due to the fall in economic activity. Still, the model helps the
comprehension of the funds used by these companies.
As it has been stressed, the major problem faced by this research is the lack of evidence
associated to other internal funds and foreign long-term finance. Without appropriate data,
progresses on the subject are almost impossible.
Accounting for different types of internal and external funds is fundamental to understand the
effects of balance sheets composition in terms of financial stability and even on the distribution
of economic value added (Almeida et al., 2016). Concerning our sample, we believe that BNDES’
loans helped firms to diminish financial fragility, because of lower interest rates (in accordance to
Rezende, 2016). However, if our hypothesis on foreign finance is correct, this certainly increased
firms’ financial fragility (similarly argued by Almeida et al., 2016). Moreover, using working
capital probably diminished firms’ liquidity and/or increased the payment on interests, since
short-term finance costs are supposed to be higher than long-term ones. Lower profit reserves
levels may also diminish firms’ capacity to deal with future unexpected retained earnings fall,
in terms of investment finance and of stabilizing shareholders’ profitability. If retained profits
keep at low levels, BNDES reinforces the fall in operations and liabilities do not fall, firms may
face difficulties to finance investment in the next years.
We conclude that empirical analysis about the finance of investment is still a poorly ex-
plored subject - at least in Brazil. Lack of evidence (and divergence among the existing ones)
undoubtedly attests it. Or economists are not“attentive to whispers which the data occasionally
emit”?
A future research agenda may include sectoral analysis, following some aspects of the post-
Keynesian theoretical framework. Also, separating firms using a priori criteria - e.g., firms’ size
- might be as revealing as sectoral analysis.
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Chapter 2
Workers’ Debt-financed Consumption:
a supermultiplier SFC model
2.1 Introduction
Historical experiences indicate that economic growth may have different drivers in different
periods. The recent US experience, with rising economic growth rates and household indebted-
ness, highlighted the connections between debt-financed consumption and the economy in the
medium-run. The Brazilian experience during the 1970s, when government was responsible for
huge public investments, also justifies the search for different causalities and demand drivers
in theoretical models. However, in heterodox growth models (autonomous) investment is fre-
quently the ultimate driver of the economy. It is not obvious “why Keynesian economists should
not tinker with different assumptions” concerning economic drivers (Brochier and Macedo e
Silva, 2017, p. 123).
Economic growth models with autonomous investment1 have dealt with debt-financed con-
sumption and its effects through time. The features of these models may vary significantly.
For example, credit may be determined by workers’ net income (Dutt, 2006), rentiers’ saving
(Hein, 2011) or by banks (Palley, 2010). Consumption function may include an emulation effect
and income distribution may be endogenous (Zezza, 2008; Kim, 2012; Ryoo and Kim, 2014).
Households may save and pay a share of their debt (Godley and Lavoie, 2007; Barba and Pivetti,
2009).
This literature is concerned with whether household debt can become a restriction to eco-
nomic growth in the long run. Its main conclusion is that consumption financed out of credit
has positive effects in the short run, but ambiguous results in the long run (Dutt, 2006; Hein,
2011; Palley, 2010; Godley and Lavoie, 2007; Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Ryoo and Kim, 2014).
This happens because higher consumption fueled by banking credit raises output and income,
but also increases consumers’ debt, leading to higher interest payments, lower disposable income
and, finally, to lower economic growth.
Particular attention is paid in this literature to the shift from a “debt-led” to a “debt-
burdened” growth regime (Hein, 2011). In general, this happens when economic growth rate in
the steady state (given by the steady-state autonomous investment in neo-Kaleckian models)
is lower than borrowing costs. In Hein (2011) this condition is given by α > θsRi, where α
represents firms’ animal spirits, θ is the proportion of rentiers’ saving going to households, sR
1Exception to Godley and Lavoie (2007) where government expenditures lead the economy.
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the marginal propensity to save of rentiers and i the interest rate. In Barba and Pivetti (2009),
if households devote no income to amortize their debt, high levels of the interest rate imply that
their debt-income ratio will grow.
Supermultiplier models offer an alternative to the aforementioned literature. In these mod-
els, investment is fully induced, and changes in the growth rate of autonomous components of
demand2 permanently affect the growth rate of output and productive capacity (Freitas and Ser-
rano, 2015). Additionally, investment rate is endogenous due to the presence of the autonomous
component. Pariboni (2016) and Fagundes (2017) have introduced autonomous consumption
into the supermultiplier model, and their main conclusion is that higher consumption financed
out of credit does not necessarily lead to higher indebtedness. In fact, it leads to a decrease in
the debt to capital ratio.
However, supermultiplier models lack an adequate treatment of financial issues. As Freitas
and Serrano (2015, p. 23) recognize, “research efforts should focus on the determinants and dy-
namics (particularly financial) of the trend of growth of the different ’unproductive’ autonomous
components of demand”.
It seems natural, therefore, to conclude that a lot can be learned by phrasing supermultiplier
models in “stock-flow consistent” (SFC) frameworks (Godley and Lavoie, 2007), for these are
built precisely to make sure that one deals rigorously with the dynamics of finance.
In this chapter we make an attempt to “tinker with different assumptions” by building a
supermultiplier SFC growth model with workers’ debt-financed consumption as the driver of
economic growth. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews the literature.
Section 2.3 presents the structural and behavioral hypothesis of the model. Section 2.4 then
solves the model analytically both in the short and the long runs. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Presenting the debt-financed consumption literature
and the main results
Hein (2011) asserts that there are three types of modelling approaches that focus on house-
hold debt: i) multiplier-accelerator business cycle model, as proposed by Palley (1994), ii) models
focusing on wealth-effects on consumption, as done by Bhaduri et al. (2006), and iii) growth
and distribution models concentrating on the effects of consumer credit on demand and debt,
in the short and long runs3. We focus on the third group of models and the results concerning
the effects of higher debt-financed consumption on economic growth and workers’ indebtedness.
Dutt (2006, p. 341) incorporates debt-financed consumption in a Steindlian growth model to
“examine whether, in the presence of consumer debt, Steindl’s arguments about the tendency of
mature economies towards stagnation are still valid”. In the short run an increase in consumption
through borrowing is expansionary because increases the utilization rate, and consequently the
economic growth rate. In the long run, it increases workers’ indebtedness, but the effect on
2Autonomous component of demand is that part of demand that is not related to the current level of output
resulting from firms’ production decisions (Freitas and Serrano, 2015, p. 4).
3In Palley (1994) an increase in household debt stimulates aggregate demand in the short run, but debt
burden diminishes it in the long run. Palley’s (1994) model, however, is phrased in in levels (and not in growth
terms) and does not deal with stock-flow or stock ratios. Bhaduri et al. (2006) shows the (positive) effects of
increased financial wealth on households’ willingness to consume. As in Palley (1994), the positive effects of
consumer borrowing are offset by higher interest obligations. . Here we focus on the third approach described
by Hein (2011)
40
economic growth is ambiguous because higher consumption financed out of credit also increases
the stock of debt, shifting income from workers to capitalists (with lower propensity to consume)
through more interest payments. The long-run effect on economic growth depends on whether
g exceeds si, that is the propensity to save of rentiers multiplied by the interest rate: if g > si,
the impact of higher borrowing impacts relatively more aggregate demand than workers’ debt,
and the contrary is also true. Dutt (2006) stresses that higher indebtedness is more likely to
occur when autonomous investment is weak.
Hein (2011) assumes that credit going to workers depends on a share of rentiers’ saving (θ)
- differently from Dutt (2006), where current borrowing is determined by a ratio of workers’
income net of interest payments. As in Dutt (2006), in the short run an increase in workers’
borrowing causes higher utilization rate and higher economic growth rate. The same shock in
the long run may generate two results depending on the relative sizes of the interest rate (i)
and of the profit rate4 (r). If r > i, an increase in workers’ borrowing causes higher u and
g, and aggregate demand and capital accumulation are debt-led. In this case, the “paradox of
debt” could occur: this paradox implies that higher consumption financed by loans causes lower
indebtedness. If r < i, an increase in borrowing causes lower u and g, and aggregate demand
and capital accumulation are debt-burdened5,6.
Palley (2010) explores the effects of private debt on economic growth in a Cambridge-
Kaleckian framework. His objective is to understand how interest transfers from debtors to
creditors affect short-run economic activity and the steady-state growth. In the short run of the
loanable funds model7, the effect of higher debt on aggregate saving is ambiguous because higher
debt simultaneously increases interest transfers to capitalists (with higher marginal propensity
to consume) and workers’ borrowing. This ambiguity remains in the long run, where increased
debt may be contractionary or expansionary depending on the relative size of each effect (Palley,
2010, p. 298).
Godley and Lavoie (2007, chapter 11) build a SFC growth model by integrating Keynesian
and Kaleckian macroeconomics, where real pure government expenditures grow at a constant
rate and determine the economic growth rate. Consumption is determined by expected dis-
posable income and net lending8. Higher loans-income ratio only leads to higher output and
consumption in the short run. In the steady state, both variables decrease in comparison to the
baseline scenario. Additionally, workers’ indebtedness and the debt-service burden of personal
debt also increase.
Barba and Pivetti (2009) reach similar conclusions to Dutt (2006) and Hein (2011) about the
necessary conditions for a sustainable growth path when workers use credit to finance consump-
tion. Barba and Pivetti’s 2009 main argument is that because of conspicuous redistribution of
income in the USA since the beginning of the 1980s, rising debt is a response of households to
increase their standard of living and “keep up” with higher income groups in a context of falling
or stagnant real wages. They find that if households devote no income to amortize the stock of
debt, the ratio debt-income will grow if the interest rate is larger than the income growth rate.
Zezza (2008) is concerned with the apparent puzzle given by the fact that the fall in the
4Reminding that, in Hein (2011), the profit rate is endogenous, determined by the utilization rate.
5Hein (2011) argues that a transition from short-run debt-led to long-run debt-burdened only happens if
there is a change in parameters affecting r: a fall in the animal spirits, a change in the profit share, a rise in the
rentiers’ propensity to save or an increase in the interest rate.
6These conclusions only apply if α > θsri, where α represents the animal spirits.
7Palley (2010) also develops a model with endogenous money, and results are similar.
8Banks finance consumption and the acquisition of financial assets.
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propensity to save observed in the US since mid 90s happened at the same time in which income
distribution was changing in favour of the top percentiles. His hypothesis is that changes in
the value of financial and real assets owned by the richest quintile, increasing capital gains
from equity and specially housing market, caused the decline in the saving rate and drove
economic growth. The introduction of emulation effect on per capita consumption of workers
against per capita consumption of capitalists leads to lower saving-disposable income ratio
and, consequently, to higher workers’ indebtedness. Lastly, a fall in the interest rate decreases
leverage and increases investments.
Kim (2012) builds a neo-Kaleckian SFC growth model along the lines of Godley and Lavoie
(2007). Kim’s (2012) model, however, incorporates consumer debt, consumption emulation
(financed by credit) and endogeneizes income distribution, with the objective of evaluating
the consequences of debt-financed consumption emulation to income distribution and economic
growth. In the short and medium runs, an increase in the emulation effect is expansionary, rais-
ing utilization rate and capital accumulation. Stable equilibrium (and economically meaningful)
values for debt-capital ratio depends on high values for the animal spirits, as in Dutt (2006).
Adding endogenous loans, consumption emulation and income distribution in a Cambridge
growth model, where fluctuations in aggregate demand determine profit margins, Ryoo and
Kim (2014) show that an increase in workers’ emulation motives have overall negative effects
on workers’ consumption. This paradox is explained by two opposite effects of an increase
in emulation motives financed by loans: i) a positive effect on consumption caused by higher
borrowing, and ii) a negative effect on consumption caused by banks’ reluctance in extend
further loans (due to lower wage share), that more than compensates the positive effect.
More recently supermultiplier models have offered an alternative theoretical approach to
economic growth with consumer debt. These models differ from neo-Kaleckian models in three
fundamental ways. First, their investment function is different, for investment is induced rather
than autonomous. Second, the investment share in GDP is endogenous. And finally, an au-
tonomous, exogenous demand component is invariably added to the model, driving economic
growth.
Fagundes (2017) offers a detailed analysis of a supermultiplier growth model with consumer
debt and amortization. Workers’ consumption function is determined as
Cw = cw[ωY − (r + i)Lw] + Ew. (2.1)
where ω is the wage share, cw the marginal propensity to consume of workers, i is the interest
rate, r the amortization rate and Ew represents new loans financing only consumption. The
growth rate of Ew drives economic growth. Debt variation is defined as
∆L = Ew − rLw (2.2)
where rLw represents the amortization payment on beginning-of-period debt. Rentiers’ con-
sumption is zero and banks accommodate all workers’ demand for loans.
In Fagundes’ (2017) model, an increase in consumption financed by credit decreases workers’
indebtedness (Lw/Y ) because income grows relatively more than debt
9. Concerning the impact
9According to Fagundes (2017), in neo-Kaleckian models consumption financed by credit only affects the
equilibrium growth rate through the utilization rate (and the net impact of an increase in the autonomous
consumption is ambiguous in the long run).
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on economic activity, in the short run higher growth rate of Ew is expansionary, while in the
long run it has no effect on current utilization rate, given that u = un.
Since the autonomous component drives output and debt growth rates, the distinction be-
tween “debt-led” and “debt-burdened” (Hein, 2011) does not apply. The relevant cases become
those “in which loans growth rate is large enough to sustain a continuous aggregate demand
expansion and in which gEw is not large enough” (Fagundes, 2017, p. 170)
10.
Finally, due to the inclusion of the amortization rate, output growth rate does not need to
be higher than interest rate for debt to be sustainable in the steady state11, as it is the case
in some neo-Kaleckian models (Dutt, 2006; Hein, 2011). The conditions for sustainable debt in
Fagundes’ (2017) model are i) gEw ≥ −r and ii) Ew < (r + i)Lw. Above the upper limit given
by the Keynesian stability condition, the higher the workers’ propensity to get indebted, the
higher the employment and the income12.
Pariboni’s (2016) and Fagundes’ (2017) theoretical specifications are quite similar. In Pari-
boni (2016) the economic driver is
Ca = Zw − cw(r + i)Lw, (2.3)
and not Ew, as it is the case in Fagundes (2017).
Conclusions are similar as well. Pariboni (2016) argues that “if consumer debt is the only
source of autonomous demand, the rate of growth of debt is never too high” (Pariboni, 2016,
p. 226)13, due to the effect of debt-financed consumption on output and capital stock. In both
models, workers’ indebtedness is worsened if wage share falls.
We summarize the main results. In most of the models, an increase in debt-financed con-
sumption is expansionary in the short run. The only exception seems to be Ryoo and Kim’s
(2014) model, where, paradoxically, an increase in workers’ credit demand associated with em-
ulation motives diminishes both the level and the share of workers’ consumption and, therefore,
economic activity.
In the long run, an increase in debt-financed consumption generates ambiguous effects in
Dutt (2006), Hein (2011) and Palley (2010), and results are conditioned to the relatives sizes
of proxies for economic activity (economic growth in Dutt and profit rate - determined by
utilization rate - in Hein) and borrowing costs (interest rate in both models). Therefore, the
main reason for the shift from a short-run expansionary process to a long-run contractionary
one is the amount of interest payments going from workers to rentiers (with lower propensity
to consume), or simply the higher debt-burden that lowers workers’ disposable income and,
consequently, consumption. Endogenous changes in income distribution also play a role (Kim,
2012; Ryoo and Kim, 2014).
In Godley and Lavoie (2007) and Zezza (2008), long-run effects on economic activity are
negative. In Kim (2012), effects are positive in the short and the long runs. In supermultiplier
10In the case that it is not large enough, debt may become unsustainable, that would be the case either if
gEw < −r or Ew < (r + i)Lw.
11Fagundes (2017, p. 166) adds that the independence of the interest rate does not imply that it can assume
any value.
12This result depends on a non-negative amortization rate.
13It doesn’t mean, however, that debt can grow indefinitely. As Pariboni (2016) reminds us, for a demand-led
growth regime to be viable, the autonomous demand growth rate must be lower than a threshold function of
income distribution (aggregate propensity to save) technical conditions and the investment’s reaction coefficient
(Freitas and Serrano, 2015, p. 272).
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models (Pariboni, 2016; Fagundes, 2017) it does not affect long-run utilization rate, equal to
the normal one.
An increase in debt-financed consumption rises workers’ long-run indebtedness in Dutt
(2006), Godley and Lavoie (2007) and Barba and Pivetti (2009). In Hein (2011) the effect
is ambiguous, but the paradox of debt is a possibility. It is noteworthy that in Dutt (2006)
higher indebtedness is more likely to occur when autonomous investment in weak. In supermul-
tiplier models (Pariboni, 2016; Fagundes, 2017), the paradox of debt is the norm (under some
conditions).
2.3 A supermultiplier SFC model with workers’ autonomous
consumption
The purpose of this section is to present a simplified economic growth model based on au-
tonomous workers’ debt in which all (interrelated) sectoral intertemporal budget constraints
are modeled and their dynamic implications explicitly taken into consideration. By “simpli-
fied” we mean not including features such as credit restrictions of any nature or another au-
tonomous component. The objective is to facilitate the discussion with other supermultiplier
models. Next section describes the financial structure of our stylized economy and all its logical-
dynamic implications. Section 2.3.2 “closes” the model with behavioral hypotheses in line with
the supermutiplier literature.
2.3.1 Structural hypotheses and their logical implications
The financial framework of our stylized economy is summarized in tables 2.1 (balance sheet
matrix), 2.2 (current transactions matrix) and 2.3 (flow of funds matrix). The accounting is
implied by the structural-theoretical hypotheses of the model. It summarizes, in other words,
all “system-wide” logical implications of these hypotheses.
Table 2.1 represents assets and liabilities of the four institutional sectors assumed in our
economy: workers, rentiers, firms and banks. Introducing workers’ consumption financed by
credit in any given model logically implies the introduction of a debt stock (Lw) and at least
one other agent/sector that supply these loans. The most natural way to deal with this issue is
to include a banking sector and rentiers in the model. It is also natural to assume that workers
also hold deposits (Dw) in banks.
Rentiers also hold deposits (Dr), but do not get bank loans, for we are not concerned with
rentiers’ indebtedness here. Firms, on the other hand, use bank loans to finance investment,
and consequently, hold a debt stock (Lf ). We simplify matters here assuming that firms do not
issue equities. We also assume that banks accommodate all demand for loans and deposits and
distribute all their profits, so their net worth is zero.
Current transactions in our artificial economy are described in table 2.2. These transactions
are simple and intuitive. Workers pay interest on their debt and buy goods and services using
wages and loans to do so (represented in table 2.3). Workers also save a fraction of their income,
which consists only of wages14. We assume rentiers own firms and banks, and as a consequence
their income is determined by distributed profits, that they use to buy goods from firms and
to save. Firms’ revenues are determined by workers’ and rentiers’ consumption, and firms’
14For deposits are not remunerated.
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Table 2.1: Balance sheets matrix
Workers Rentiers Firms Banks Totals
1 Deposits +Dw +Dr −D 0
2 Loans −Lw −Lf +L 0
3 Capital goods +K +K
Net worth Vw Dr Vf 0 +K
Table 2.2: Current transactions matrix
Workers Rentiers
Firms
Banks Total
Current Capital
1 Consumption −Cw −Cr +C 0
2 Investment +I −I 0
3 Accounting memo: Y ≡ C + I ≡ W + FD + FU
4 Wages +W −W 0
5 Profits FD + Fb −FD −Fb 0
6 Interest on loans −i.Lw−1 −i.Lf−1 +i.L−1 0
7 Total SAVw SAVr FU −I 0 0
Table 2.3: Flow of funds matrix
Workers Rentiers Firms Banks Totals
1 Current saving SAVw SAV r FU 0 SAV
2 Workers amortization −rLw−1 +rLw−1 0
3 Workers new loans +Ew −Ew 0
4 ∆ Firms loans +∆Lf −∆Lf 0
5 ∆ Fixed capital −I −I
6 ∆ Deposits −∆Dw −∆Dr +∆D 0
7 Total 0 0 0 0 0
∆ Net worth ∆Vw = SAVw ∆Dr = SAVr ∆Lf = I − FU 0 SAV = I
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investment15. Firms also pay wages to workers, interest on their debt stock and distribute
profits to rentiers.
Naturally enough, saving flows affect end-of-period stocks, represented in table 2.3. Workers
use savings to either pay a share of their debt (amortization) or increase deposits. New loans
(Ew) are a source of funds used to finance autonomous consumption. Rentiers use saving
to finance the acquisition of financial assets. Firms’ saving (retained profits) is smaller than
investments, forcing firms to finance their deficits16 with bank loans that feed into firms’ debt
stock.
2.3.2 Closing the model
Workers’ consumption function (equation 2.4) has an induced and an autonomous compo-
nent, financed by new loans:
Cw = cw[ωY − (r + i)Lw−1] + Ew. (2.4)
Ew grows at a given exogenous rate, differently from most part of the literature, where au-
tonomous consumption financed out of credit is endogenous and depends on different variables:
workers’ net income (Dutt, 2006), a share of rentiers’ saving (Hein, 2011), expected dispos-
able income and net lending (Godley and Lavoie, 2007), wealth (Zezza, 2008) and consumption
emulation (Kim, 2012; Ryoo and Kim, 2014). In our model an endogenous autonomous con-
sumption would make things more complicated. We stress that our function is identical to
Pariboni’s (2016) and Fagundes’ (2017) ones.
New loans feed into workers’ debt stock Lw, defined in equation (2.5):
Lw = Lw−1 + Ew − rLw−1 (2.5)
where r is the amortization rate and rLw−1 is the amortization paid to the banks. So, workers’
debt stock increases whenever workers increase consumption financed by credit or pay a share
of Lw−1. Equation (2.5) may be written in terms of net borrowing, as equation (2.6):
∆Lw = Ew − rLw−1. (2.6)
Disposable income is defined in equation (2.7) as the amount of wages less interest payments
to banks:
Yd = ωY − i.Lw−1. (2.7)
Workers’ saving (equation 2.8) is determined by disposable income less consumption. Dif-
ferently from the Kaleckian hypothesis, workers do not spend what they get; saving finances
the acquisition of financial assets (deposits) and allows workers to pay a share of debt in the
beginning of period, as is explicit in the workers’ column of the flow of funds table:
SAVw = Yd − Cw. (2.8)
15As in Dos Santos and Zezza (2008, p. 446), the reason investment appears in table 2.2 is “to stress that
firms buy goods and services from themselves”. Because firms’ acquisition of machinery and equipments implies
changes in their assets, it is considered as a “capital” transaction, reappearing in table 2.3.
16Imposed by a specific set of parameters and initial values.
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We obtain workers’ net deposits as the sum of saving and net borrowing. Since the latter
variables are both determined by behavioral equations, deposits are determined as a residual
in equation (2.9). In other words, deposits will adjust to the choices of consumption and the
desire (or need) to accumulate debt:
∆Dw = SAVw + ∆Lw. (2.9)
A different way of writing equation (2.9) is through workers’ budget constraint Dw ≡ Dw−1+
ωY −Cw− iLw−1− rLw−1−Ew in the flow of funds table. After a few manipulations, equation
(2.10) tells us that deposits increase when marginal propensity to save or wages increase, or
when payment of interest and amortization decrease (because of lower values of i, r or Lw−1):
∆Dw = sw[ωY − (r + i)Lw−1]. (2.10)
Rentiers consume a share cr of firms’ and banks’ distributed profits (equation 2.11). Rentiers’
consumption appears because we have to assume rentiers, as explained in section 2.3.1. They
save the amount determined by total income less consumption (equation 2.12), as table 2 shows,
and use savings to acquire bank deposits (equation 2.13).
Cr = cr(FD + Fb) (2.11)
SAVr = FD + Fb− Cr. (2.12)
∆Dr = SAVr (2.13)
Firms decide the mark-up µ on wage costs (equation 2.14), and from the mark-up we are
able to define the functional income distribution in our model, given by the profit (pi) and the
wage (ω) shares (equation 2.15):
pi =
µ
1 + µ
(2.14)
pi + ω = 1. (2.15)
Net profit is defined as total profit less interest payments on beginning-of-period debt stock
of firms (equation 2.16). Firms distribute a share ρ of net profit (equation 2.17) and retain
(1− ρ) (equation 2.18):
FT = piY − iLf−1 (2.16)
FD = ρFT (2.17)
FU = (1− ρ)FT (2.18)
Firms’ investment is totally induced by output (equation 2.19), following the supermultiplier
specification:
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I = hY. (2.19)
Capital stock adjustment principle determines the behavior of aggregate investment, and accord-
ing to this principle capitalists try to adjust productive capacity to demand17. This specification
for the investment function is different from specifications in Cambridge growth models, where
investment is an autonomous component of demand, and in neo-Kaleckian models, where it is
partially induced when include utilization rate as a determinant (Serrano and Freitas, 2017). As
we discuss further below, the fact that investment is totally induced is fundamental to some of
our results concerning indebtedness of workers and firms. Pariboni (2016) and Fagundes (2017)
adopt the same specification for the investment function.
Utilization rate (equation 2.20) is defined as the ratio between current output (Y ) and
capacity output (Yfc), that depends, by its turn, on the existing level of capital stock (K−1) and
on the technical capital-output ratio (v) (equation 2.21):
u =
Y
Yfc
(2.20)
Yfc =
K−1
v
. (2.21)
Endogenous changes in the marginal propensity to invest h (equation 2.22) depends on
discrepancies between the current utilization rate (u) and the normal utilization rate (un). The
parameter γ represents the speed of the productive capacity adjustment to these discrepancies,
through higher investment ratios:
∆h = h−1γ(u− un). (2.22)
As in Serrano and Freitas (2017), we assume that γ has a positive small value because it
is reasonable to expect that firms do not try to adjust all capital stock to every fluctuation
in demand18. Endogenous changes in h are guaranteed by the existence of the autonomous
component (Freitas and Serrano, 2015).
Firms’ stock of capital is defined as
K = K−1 + I − δK−1. (2.23)
Firms finance investment (equation 2.24) with retained earnings (FU) and bank loans (∆Lf ).
They resort on bank loans whenever retained earnings are not enough to finance investment.
We get the investment financing equation through the firms’ budget constraint in the flow of
funds table (table 3):
∆Lf = I − FU. (2.24)
17Matthews (1964) argues that the capital stock adjustment incorporates a special case of the acceleration
principle, in which a = v and b = 1 in the equation It = aYt−1 − bKt.
18Serrano and Freitas (2017) consider two reasons for this: i) firms would prefer normal utilization to prevail
on average over the lifetime of the productive equipment, and ii) they would be aware that some fluctuations
are temporary.
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2.4 Short and long-run equilibria of the model
One of the most important features of SFC models is the transparent treatment of the
passage of time - i.e., the dynamics of the economy is seen as a sequence of short periods (as in
Kalecki). This section aims at explaining not only this sequence, but also presenting the features
of the steady state of our model. To fulfill our objective we begin by calculating the short-run
goods market equilibrium. Then we derive a dynamic system of four equations in section 2.4.2,
stressing the importance of this set of variables to comprehend the global dynamics at each
period. Finally, in section 2.4.3 we reduce our system of four equations to a system of only two,
from which we derive the long-run steady state and all variables of our model.
2.4.1 Short-run goods market equilibrium
Short-run goods market equilibrium19 (equation 2.25) is given summing up workers’ and
rentiers’ consumption and firms’ investment and isolating Y :
Y =
Ew − Lw−1[cw(r + i)− cri] + Lf−1[cri(1− ρ)]
1− cwω − crρpi − h (2.25)
The term Ew − Lw−1[cw(r + i) − cri] + Lf−1[cri(1 − ρ)] is an autonomous component20, but
the only driver of the economy is the exogenous component Ew. Our short-run equilibrium
partially depends on workers’ and firms’ debt stock because i) debt stock of workers determines
their disposable income and, consequently, Cw, ii) Lw and Lf are also determinants of banks’
profits and therefore of Cr. It is straightforward from ii) that the short-run equilibrium goes
beyond the goods market, for it also depends on the composition of investment finance: if firms
retain more profits (distributing less to rentiers), they take less loans and pay less interests to
banks, simultaneously decreasing rentiers’ income and consumption; if they retain less profits,
they have to recur to banks, increasing debt, interest payments and, as a logical consequence,
rentiers’ consumption (for now they receive more profits from firms and banks). As assumed,
banks accommodate all demand for loans.
The supermultplier depends not only on workers’ marginal propensity to consume and on
firms’ propensity to invest, but also on rentiers’ marginal propensity to consume, and represents
the effect of induced expenditures in the output level.
Increases in workers’ debt (Lw) always reduce short-run output. Even though rentiers con-
sume a share of banks distributed profits (represented by the term Lw−1cri), this amount is
lower than households’ interest payments (Lw−1cwi), because we assume workers’ propensity to
consume is higher than rentiers’. Increases in firms’ debt (Lf ) always increase short-run output,
because they increase rentiers’ consumption and do not reduce investment (by hypothesis).
We can present equation (2.25) in a different way, substituting the term Ew by ∆Lw+rLw−1
(equation 2.5) and making ∆Lw = gLwLw−1, with gLw representing the workers’ debt growth
rate21. Thus, equation (2.25) becomes
19In the short run current utilization rate might be different from its normal rate, implying that propensity
to invest h is not fully adjusted. Also, normalized stock ratios are not constant.
20Even though interest payments (iLw−1) partially determine workers’ disposable income and rentiers’ income,
it is autonomous because it is not related to the current level of output, neither it is a result of the production
decision of firms.
21That may be written as function of the autonomous consumption growth rate if we substitute Ew by
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Y =
Lw−1[gLw + swr − i(cw − cr)] + Lf−1[cri(1− ρ)]
1− cwω − crρpi − h . (2.26)
with sw the workers’ propensity to save . Dividing equation (2.26) by the stock of capital in
the beginning of the period (K−1) gives us the short-run equilibrium utilization rate (equation
2.27):
u =
lw−1[gLw + swr − i(cw − cr)]v + lf−1cri(1− ρ)v
1− cwω − crρpi − h , (2.27)
where lw−1 (Lw−1/K−1) and lf−1 (Lf−1/K−1) represent, respectively, workers’ and firms’ stock
of debt, all normalized by beginning-of-period stock of capital22 As it is clear in equation (2.27),
economic activity now depends positively on the rate of growth of workers’ debt. It depends
also on the amount workers save to amortize their past debt.
Two conditions seem necessary for positive values of u: i) gLw + swr > i(cw − cr), ii) 1 ≥ ρ.
Propensity to save (1 − cwω − crρpi) must be larger than propensity to invest (h) to ensure
Keynesian stability.
2.4.2 The intensive dynamics of the system
Using recursive substitution we can determine the intensive dynamics of the model and solve
it analytically for the long-run steady states. Here we demonstrate that the intensive dynamics23
is given by gEw , ∆h, lw (Lw/K) and lf (Lf/K). Despite all equations that follow, from this
system we are able to derive all other equations and to calculate nominal values for all stocks
and flows.
To determine the capital stock growth rate, we divide equation (2.23) by K−1 and manipu-
late:
gk =
hu
v
− δ. (2.28)
Substituting the capacity utilization rate equation (2.27) in the capital stock growth rate (2.28)
gives us
gk = h
(
gLw lw−1 + θ1lw−1 + θ2lf−1
1− cwω − crpiρ− h
)
− δ, (2.29)
with θ1 = swr − i(cw − cr) and θ2 = cri(1 − ρ). Capital stock growth rate positively depends
on the investment ratio (h), the stock ratios (lw−1 and lf−1), the supermultiplier ( 11−cwω−crpiρ−h)
and the autonomous component growth rate (gLw), making explicit that capital accumulation
depends not only on the main driver of the economy, but also on the relative size of workers’
debt to capital ratio (lw−1).
Manipulating equation (2.28) we get firms’ propensity to invest (equation 2.30):
Ew−1(1 + gEw) in equation (2.6) and divide it by Lw−1: gLw =
Ew−1
Lw−1
(1 + gEw)− r. Thus, gLw will be constant
as long as gEw is constant.
22We follow Dos Santos & Zezza (2008) and normalize all flows by the opening stock of capital, and stocks
by the current stock of capital. If two stocks come from different periods, a few manipulations is required. For
example, when Lw−1/K, then we substitute K by K−1(1 + gk), making Lw−1/[K−1(1 + gk)] = lw−1/(1 + gk).
23In Fagundes (2017), intensive dynamics is given by gEw , h and lw.
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h =
v
u
(gk + δ). (2.30)
Dividing workers’ debt stock (equation 2.5) by the stock of capital (K) gives us the normal-
ized workers’ debt ratio lw (Lw/K)
lw =
ew + lw−1(1− r)
1 + gk
. (2.31)
If we substitute gk (equation 2.29) in the workers’ debt equation, we get
lw =
[ew + lw−1(1− r)](θ3 − h)
h[lw−1(gLw + θ1) + θ2lf−1] + (1− δ)(θ3 − h)
. (2.32)
with θ3 = 1−cwω−crpiρ. Workers’ normalized debt ratio lw (equation 2.31) increases in new loans
ratio ew and decreases in the amortization rate r. Also, in the short run workers’ indebtedness
decreases whenever capital accumulation increases. Counter intuitively, an increase in new loans
growth rate decreases lw.
To calculate the normalized workers’ deposits stock ratio we begin with their budget con-
straint given by the flow of funds matrix (table 2.3):
Dw = Dw−1 +W − Cw − (r + i)Lw−1 + Ew.
In simpler terms, this expression is equal to ∆Dw = SAVw + Ew − rL−1, with workers’ saving
given by disposable income less consumption, and net borrowing by new loans less total amorti-
zation24. Substituting the workers’ consumption function (equation 2.4) in the workers’ budget
constraint, dividing it by K and manipulating we have
dw =
dw−1 + sw[uvω − lw−1(r + i)]
1 + gk
, (2.33)
where dw = Dw/K, dw−1 = Dw−1/K−1 and lw−1 = Lw−1/K−1. Substituting u and gk in the
workers’ normalized deposit ratio results in equation (2.34)
dw =
(θ3 − h)[dw−1 − lw−1sw(r + i)] + swω[lw−1(gLw + θ1) + θ2lf−1]
h[lw−1(gLw + θ1) + θ2lf−1] + (1− δ)(θ3 − h)
. (2.34)
Workers’ normalized deposit ratio dw (equation 2.33) is a positive function of the economic
activity (u), the wage share (ω), the workers’ propensity to save (sw) and the (normalized)
stock of deposits in the beginning of the period (dw−1), but a negative function of capital stock
growth rate (gk), past debt (lw−1), the amortization and the interest rates (r and i, respectively).
In other words, the second term in the RHS shows that workers’ deposits increase whenever
workers’ saving is higher than interest and amortization payments.
To obtain the normalized deposits stock of rentiers, we follow the same procedures: from
the flow of funds table we get
Dr = Dr−1 + FD + Fb− Cr, (2.13)
substituting equations (2.11) and (2.17) into (2.13), and remembering that Fb = iL−1, we have
24Remembering that Ew − rL−1 = ∆Lw, that represents net borrowing.
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dr =
dr−1 + sr[uvpiρ+ ilw−1 + ilf−1(1− ρ)]
1 + gk
, (2.35)
where lf−1 = Lf−1/K−1. We substitute u and gk in dr and get equation (2.36):
dr =
dr−1(θ3 − h) + lw−1{sr[gLw + θ1 + i(θ3 − h)]}+ lf−1[θ2 + i[(1− ρ)(θ3 − h)]
h[lw−1(gLw + θ1) + θ2lf−1] + (1− δ)(θ3 − h)
. (2.36)
Rentiers’ normalized deposits (dr) (equation 2.35) increases in rentiers’ propensity to save (sr),
distributed profits (piρ) and in the interest workers and firms pay to banks (ilw−1 + ilf−1), and
decreases in the capital accumulation. Effect of parameter ρ is ambiguous.
The normalized debt to capital ratio of firms is associated with firms’ investment financing.
Equation (2.24) represents firms’ budget constraint,
Lf = Lf−1 + I − FU. (2.24)
If we substitute equations (2.18) and (2.19) in (2.24), and divide everything by K, we get
lf =
lf−1[1 + i(1− ρ)] + uv [h− pi(1− ρ)]
1 + gk
. (2.37)
with lf = Lf/K and lf−1 = Lf−1/K−1. Substituting u and gk in equation (2.37) gives us
lf =
lf−1{[1 + i(1− ρ)](θ3 − h) + cri(1− ρ)(h− θ4)}+ lw−1(h− θ4)(gLw + θ1)
h[lw−1(gLw + θ1) + θ2lf−1] + (1− δ)(θ3 − h)
, (2.38)
with θ4 = pi(1 − ρ). Normalized debt stock ratio of firms (equation 2.37) increases (decreases)
when debt in the beginning of period, interest rate, activity level and investment ratio increase
(decrease), and when capital accumulation and retained earnings decrease (increase). Firms’
indebtedness increases in u because when the utilization rate increases above the normal rate,
investment increases, and according to the firms’ budget constraint, this leads to higher debt.
The term h − pi(1 − ρ) indicates that firms’ debt depends on the difference between invest-
ment ratio h and retained profits pi(1 − ρ), implying that higher profit share decreases firms’
indebtedness. The effect of changes in ρ is ambiguous.
The system of four equations, responsible for the global dynamics of the model, is given by:
gLw =
∆Lw
Lw−1
∆h = h−1γ(un − u) (2.22)
lw =
[ew + lw−1(1− r)](θ3 − h)
h[lw−1(gLw + θ1) + θ2lf−1] + (1− δ)(θ3 − h)
(2.32)
lf =
lf−1{[1 + i(1− ρ)](θ3 − h) + cri(1− ρ)(h− θ4)}+ lw−1(h− θ4)(gLw + θ1)
h[lw−1(gLw + θ1) + θ2lf−1] + (1− δ)(θ3 − h)
. (2.38)
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2.4.3 Long-run steady states
In the steady growth state normalized stock ratios are constant (given all exogenous pa-
rameters), current utilization rate is equal to the normal rate (u = un) and the autonomous
consumption growth rate (gEw) determines all other growth rates. The system of four equations
is responsible for the global dynamics of the model, but it is not possible to solve it analytically.
This means that the dynamics of the model far from its steady states can only be analyzed with
the help of simulations exercises, as is often the case with SFC models.
Imposing steady-state restrictions (u = un and gk = gEw) in firms’ propensity to invest
(equation 2.30) results in
h∗ =
v
un
(gEw + δ). (2.39)
Applying the steady-state restrictions (gk = gEw and lw−1 = lw) on workers’ normalized debt
(equations 2.31) give us
l∗w =
ew
r + gEw
. (2.40)
Imposing the same restrictions after recursive substitution (equation 2.32) gives
l∗2w h
∗(gEw + θ1) + l
∗
w[l
∗
fh
∗θ2 + (θ3 − h∗)(r + δ)]− ew(θ3 − h∗) = 0. (2.41)
Workers’ normalized deposits become, respectively before and after recursive substitution:
d∗w =
sw
gEw
[
un
v
ω − l∗w(r + i)
]
(2.42)
d∗w =
h∗sw(r + i)− l∗wθ3sw(r + i) + swω[l∗w(gEw + θ1) + θ2l∗f ]
h∗[1 + l∗w(gEw + θ1) + θ2l
∗
f ] + (1− δ)(θ3 − h∗)− θ3
. (2.43)
Rentiers’ steady-state deposits are presented in equations (2.44) and (2.45), respectively
originated from equations (2.35) and (2.36):
d∗r =
sr
gEw
[un
v
piρ+ il∗w + il
∗
f (1− ρ)
]
(2.44)
d∗r =
l∗w[piρsr(gEw + θ1) + sri(θ3 − h∗)] + l∗f [piρsrθ2 + sri(1− ρ)(θ3 − h∗)]
h∗[1 + l∗w(gEw + θ1) + θ2l
∗
f ]− δ(θ3 − h∗)
. (2.45)
To obtain the steady-state firms’ debt ratio, we impose lf = lf−1, gk = gEw , u = un and
h = h∗ in equation (2.37) to get
l∗f =
un
v
[h∗ − pi(1− ρ)]
gEw − i(1− ρ)
. (2.46)
Positive values for l∗f require h
∗ − pi(1 − ρ) and gEw > i(1 − ρ). The steady-state normalized
stock of firms’ debt may also be written as
l∗2f h
∗θ2+l∗f{l∗wh∗(gEw+θ1)+(θ3−h∗)[−δ−i(1−ρ)]−cri(1−ρ)[h−pi(1−ρ)]}−l∗w(h∗−θ11)(gLw+θ1) = 0.
(2.47)
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Table 2.4: Values derived from each cubic root of l∗w
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3
l∗w 0.265 0.330 -0.955
l∗f 1.176 -3.072 0.621
d∗w 0.980 3.303 0.589
d∗r 0.461 0.779 0.267
l∗w + l
∗
f − d∗w − d∗r 0,000 -6.824 -1.190
u 0.800 0.255 -2.088
after recursive substitution (in equation 2.38).
It is perfectly possible to calculate the long-run steady states of the model. If gLw = gEw (a
constant) and ∆h = 0, the system of four equations is reduced to a system of two, l∗w and l
∗
f
(respectively equations 2.41 and 2.47). Therefore, we have a system of two equations in l∗w and
l∗f :
l∗2w h
∗(gEw + θ1) + l
∗
w[l
∗
fh
∗θ2 + (θ3 − h∗)(r + δ)]− ew(θ3 − h∗) = 0 (2.41)
l∗2f h
∗θ2+l∗f{l∗wh∗(gEw+θ1)+(θ3−h∗)[−δ−i(1−ρ)]−cri(1−ρ)[h−pi(1−ρ)]}−l∗w[h∗−pi(1−ρ)](gLw+θ1) = 0.
(2.47)
Isolating l∗f in equation (2.41) and substituting it in equation (2.47) results in
l3wψ1 + l
2
wψ2 + lwψ3 + ψ4 = 0. (2.48)
The cubic equation25 (2.48) indicates that the model has three equilibrium values (with economic
meanings or not). If more than one is economically meaningful, that indicates the model has
more than one regime, and reaching one or the other will depend on parameters’ values and
initial conditions. For given values of parameters and initial values26 we solve numerically27
equation (2.48) for l∗w. Values for stock ratios, capacity utilization rate and a test for accounting
consistency are found in table 2.4.
The resolution of the cubic equation above implies that all steady-state values may be
determined from the parameters of our model. Table 4 shows that root 1 generates a consistent
(as verified by the sum of the ratios) and economically meaningful steady state. The other two
roots do not imply consistent steady states.
From the normalized workers’ debt ratio (l∗w) it is possible to determine l
∗
f (equation 2.47)
and, from these, d∗w and d
∗
r (respectively equations 2.43 and 2.45). Normalized debt ratios also
allow the determination of the utilization rate in the steady state, given all parameters, gEw and
propensity to invest h∗. Finally, assuming an initial value for K−1 and multiplying it by the
ratios we find these value in level for each flow and stock.
25With ψ1 =
gEw+θ1
cri(1−ρ) (θ3− h)[r+ i(1− ρ)], ψ2 =
(θ3−h)(r−δ)
hcri(1−ρ) {(θ3− h)[r+ i(1− ρ)] + [h− pi(1− ρ)]cri(1− ρ)}−
ew(θ3−h)
cri(1−ρ) [gEw + θ1], ψ3 =
ew(θ3−h)
cri(1−ρ) {(θ3 − h)[δ − i(1− ρ)− 2r]− cri(1− ρ)[h− pi(1− ρ)]} and ψ4 =
[ew(θ3−h)]2
hcri(1−ρ) .
26Values of scenario 1 in the Appendix.
27Roots were found using the package polyroot in software R (2016).
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2.5 Conclusions
Most heterodox growth models that include workers’ debt actually have the autonomous
investment as the main driver of the economy. The supermultiplier theoretical framework allows
any autonomous component (that does not create productive capacity) to be the long-run driver,
but they lack an adequate treatment of financial features. Our model solves this issue by framing
the supermultiplier into an appropriate financial framework.
Literature review shows that increases in consumption financed out of credit is, in most
of the models, expansionary in the short run, but generates ambiguous results in the long run.
Contractionary effects in the long run are caused by the amount of interest payments going from
workers to rentiers, with lower propensity to consume. Ambiguous results normally depend on
the relative sizes of interest rate and the increase of debt-financed consumption or the growth
rate of the economy. In supermultiplier models, an increase in debt-financed consumption
is expansionary in the short run, but it has no effect on the long-run utilization rate, given
that u = un. The main conclusion from supermultiplier models is that higher consumption
financed by credit normally leads to lower indebtedness because during the adjustment process
capital stock (or income) grows in average relatively more than the autonomous component.
Neo-Kaleckian models also reproduce the paradox of debt, but under stricter conditions than
supermultiplier models.
Despite its relative simplicity, our model generates more than one steady state, but only
one of them has an economic meaning. The possibility of more than one steady state arises
due to the logical restrictions imposed by the SFC approach, and this is one of the reasons
why accounting consistency should not be disregarded. However, this is not a common concern
even among SFC practitioners, who have produced complex models without exploring all their
logical consequences.
Other important, provisional conclusions are the following:
a) the intensive dynamics of the model is given by four variables: gLw , ∆h, lw and lf ;
b) it is possible to calculate all ratios from the normalized workers’ debt to capital ratio (l∗w);
c) steady-state stock ratios (before recursive substitution) show that these values depend on
each sectoral budget constraint, and as we demonstrate in the next chapter, getting financial
balances right is essential to determine how stocks evolve over time.
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Chapter 3
Exploring and Running Simulations in
the supermultiplier SFC model
3.1 Phrasing the supermultiplier model through sectoral
financial balances
In the last chapter we build a “benchmark” supermultiplier model with debt-financed con-
sumption framed by the Stock-Flow Consistent approach. This one explores, in an intuitive
way, the implications of the structural and behavioral hypothesis adopted. The main objective
is to combine the supermultiplier mechanisms, that emphasizes the adjustment of productive
capacity to demand, and sectoral financial balances analysis. From this combination we intend
to describe how stocks (and stock ratios) evolve over time, and how they respond to exogenous
shocks in some parameters.
So far, growth models with autonomous consumption financed by debt have not applied
the analysis based on financial balances to explain the intrinsic dynamics of stocks. Nor have
explored the interconnection between sectoral financial balances. Therefore, additionally to the
analysis of workers’ financial balance and net wealth, we highlight how firms and rentiers adjust
to changes in the growth rate of the economy.
After a literary explanation on the model dynamics, we run some numerical simulations
experiments to understand the dynamics of the model far from the steady states. Our objective
is to understand whether results of supermultiplier models stand in a dynamic framework where
finance and (intertemporal) sectoral budget constraints are being considered.
3.1.1 A brief look at the supermultiplier dynamics: causalities and
magnitudes of changes in the growth rate of Ew
Here we review the main theoretical causalities of the supermultiplier growth model. The
focus is on the effects of exogenous shocks on the autonomous component growth rate. Com-
prehending the order and the magnitude of each effect is fundamental to interpret the results
of our model1.
Assume a positive shock on gEw . Starting from a fully adjusted position, a rise in the
(exogenous) growth rate of consumption financed out of credit increases current utilization
1These causalities are described in Freitas and Serrano (2015).
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above the normal rate. Investment increases as a reaction of increased current utilization,
reinforcing economic expansion. The investment share of output increases2 as a consequence
of u > un, and the higher multiplier (1/(1 − cwω − crρpi − h)) increases workers’ and rentiers’
consumption. The key point is that in a first moment, aggregate demand increases faster than
capital stock and capacity output.
After a while, capital stock and capacity output grow faster than aggregate demand due to
the relatively higher increase in the investment level (compared to the aggregate demand levels).
It is the existence of the autonomous component that prevents aggregate demand from changing
in the exact proportion the level of investment has changed (Freitas and Serrano, 2015). So,
capital stock grows faster for a sufficient period so that it allows the adjustment of productive
capacity to demand, bringing u back to un. In the steady state, all growth rates are equal to
the new autonomous consumption growth rate.
The crucial point for our purposes is that the capital stock has to increase faster than the
autonomous consumption for a given period so that the model reaches the steady growth state,
and that happens because investment grows relatively faster than aggregate demand. Therefore,
we know that higher gEw increases average capital stock growth rate relatively more than output,
income and workers’ debt (exogenously given) average growth rates.
A change in income distribution has transient impacts on growth rates because it alters
only the level of variables. In this case, a decrease in the wage share decreases the induced
share of workers’ consumption and the multiplier, causing the fall in output and decreasing
current utilization rate under the normal rate. Investment falls because propensity to invest
falls, diminishing the multiplier and the output even more.
The fall in economic activity impacts negatively the marginal propensity to invest, and cap-
ital stock growth rate falls relatively more than aggregate demand (again, due to the relatively
larger decrease of investment levels). This scenario (gad > gk, with gad being the aggregate
demand growth rate) continues until the utilization rate reaches its normal rate and propensity
to invest returns to its trend rate. The output growth rate returns to its initial rate because the
autonomous component continued growing at the same rate during all the adjustment process
- firms did not have to adjust their capacity permanently, but only temporarily.
Despite the fact changes in growth rates are only transient, these changes affect the indebt-
edness of workers and firms. In the case of workers’ indebtedness, it is easy to foresee that a
fall in the wage share increases workers’ indebtedness (lw) in the long run because capital stock
grows at a relatively lower rate for a period, while debt always grows at a constant rate.
Changes in the interest rate also have only level effects, as changes in income distribution.
3.1.2 Another look at financial balances and their interrelationships
Keeping track of sectoral stock-flow is one fundamental concern of the SFC approach (Macedo
e Silva and Dos Santos, 2011). In our model, workers and firms hold, each one, one asset and
one liability, rentiers hold only assets, and banks’ net worth is zero (table 2.1). Both debt stocks
generate financial flows (interest payments) between sectors, and together with flows from real
economic activities (table 2.2) affect balance sheets at the end of each period. How these stocks
change over time within the supermultiplier model causalities?
We begin discussing changes in the stock levels. Workers’ debt variation (∆Lw) depends
on new loans less amortization on beginning-of-period debt stock (equation 2.6). Workers’
2“(...) for firms are being collectively driven by competition to make their capacity levels catch up with the
permanently faster growth trend of demand” (Freitas and Serrano, 2015, p. 16).
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funds to buy financial assets (∆Dw) depend on the propensity to save income after interest and
amortization payments, as demonstrated by equation 2.10:
∆Dw = sw[ωY − Lw−1(r + i)].
Workers have positive net worth (∆Dw − ∆Lw) if their available funds to acquire deposits is
higher than the change in debt stock. When funds to buy financial assets are lower than net
new loans, this difference is negative. The relative size of new loans matters because it is one
important determinant of workers’ net wealth. Depending on the parameters and initial values,
if net new loans are always higher than financial assets acquisition funds, it means workers
accumulate deficits, which in turn increases a sector’s surplus.
For now we assume that workers’ funds to buy deposits are higher than net new loans,
implying that their net worth is positive.
Firms’ debt increases according to the difference between expenditures on investment and
retained profits (equation 2.24). Firms accumulate deficits because retained profits are not
enough to finance investment, forcing them to take loans. Rentiers’ stock of deposits (equation
2.13) changes according to their saving, a function of (firms’ and banks’) distributed profits less
rentiers’ consumption.
Now, in the steady growth state, all stocks should grow at the rate given by the debt-financed
consumption, the autonomous component of demand. So, how a change in workers’ financial
balance - through, say, an increase in the new loans growth rate - affects firms’ and rentiers’
financial balances, and the rate their stocks grow? Steady state growth rates are given by:
gEw =
∆Lw
Lw−1
=
∆Dw
Dw−1
=
∆Lf
Lf−1
=
∆Dr
Dr−1
. (3.1)
We know that a permanent increase in new loans granted to workers automatically alters
the rate at which workers’ debt grows. But new loans also impact positively economic activity
because their only purpose is consumption financing, and this increase affects firms’ deficits and
debt through changes in the propensity to invest. If we substitute ∆Lf by equation (2.24) in
(3.1), we have
gEw =
I − FU
Lf−1
. (3.2)
Therefore, it is straightforward from equation (3.2) that the only way the growth rate of firms’
debt adjusts to a new growth rate of Ew is if the deficit of firms (I − FU) increases.
Given that investment and retained profits increase during an economic expansion, and that
income distribution is exogenous, it is an increase in the share of investment on output that
guarantees that investment grows relatively more than retained profits. Equations (2.18) and
(2.19) clarify this difference:
FU = (1− ρ)(piY − iLw−1) (2.18)
I = hY. (2.19)
These equations indicate that higher firms’ deficits are guaranteed by the increased difference
between h and pi after a permanent change on the growth rate of autonomous consumption, and
permanent higher deficits increase firms’ debt and the rate at which it grows.
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As we have seen, an increase in gEw raises debt stock of workers and firms. Consistently, table
2.1 shows that the stock of deposits must be equal to the stock of debt, and the increase in total
deposits is caused by increased workers’ and rentiers’ funds to acquire financial assets, in order
to guarantee that deposits grow in line with gEw . Workers’ funds increase due to higher income
caused by the effect of autonomous consumption growth rate on the multiplier (equation 2.6)
- even though the increase in debt stock also raises interest payments (diminishing disposable
income). Rentiers’ funds are higher because saving is higher, function of firms’ (increased)
distributed profits and of workers’ and firms’ (increased) debt stocks and their respective amount
of interest payments - if we substitute each item in the RHS of rentiers’ saving equation (2.12),
it may be written as
SAVr = sr[ρ(piY − iLf−1) + iLw−1]. (3.3)
3.1.3 Stock ratios and the relationship between investment share
and financial balances
We begin this section discussing the agents’ net wealth in terms of normalized stocks. After
that, we relate these ratios to the investment ratio (h).
Workers’ debt to capital ratio (Lw/K) in the steady state is represented in equation (2.40).
Workers get less indebted if amortization rate or new loans growth rate increase. It is counter
intuitive that permanently increasing workers’ new loans growth rate actually decreases their
indebtedness. This is so because while debt stock grows at an exogenous rate, the capital
stock grows in line with investment in order to adjust capacity to the new trend of demand -
consequently, its average growth rate is higher than workers’ debt stock during this adjustment
process. So, if debt stock grows at an exogenous rate, an increase in gEw always decreases
workers’ indebtedness3.
This conclusion is different from the ones found in the literature. Some of the papers dis-
cussed earlier conclude that an increase in consumption financed by credit is expansionary in
the short run, but contractionary in the long run. And the main cause for this turn would be
the amount of interest payments, that increases over time and compress disposable income and,
consequently, consumption. In our supermultiplier SFC model these conclusions do not hold for
two reasons. The first one is that a rise in debt-financed consumption is expansionary in the
short run as well, but in the long run it has no effect at all in economic activity because current
utilization rate always tends to the normal rate. The second reason is that output and income
growth is led by the autonomous component of demand, and even though debt (and interest
payments) increases with the new loans growth rate, wages increase in line with it, and for this
reason interest payments never “compress” workers’ disposable income.
Workers’ deposits to capital ratio in the steady state (Dw/K) depends positively on the
propensity to save and the wage share, and negatively on gEw and the amount of interest and
amortization payments on debt to capital ratio (equation 2.42). From this equation, however, it
is not evident that after a positive shock on gEw , h increases and allows the average capital stock
growth rate to be higher than deposits growth rate, decreasing d∗w. Assuming that workers save
and their net worth is positive4, it follows that workers’ net worth normalized by the capital
3This result stands even if we consider a more appropriate indebtedness indicator, such as Lw/Yd, since
average growth rate of income is higher than workers’ debt growth rate.
4Deposits have a higher average growth rate that debt during the adjustment of productive capacity to
demand - as explained in the previous subsection -, and this explains why deposits vary relatively more than
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stock increases after an increase in gEw
5. Therefore, we may establish that workers’ normalized
net worth and investment share are positively related.
Firms’ debt to capital ratio (Lf/K) in the steady state (equation 2.46), depends on two
differences: i) the difference between investment ratio and retained profits (in the numerator)
and ii) between economic growth and interest payments (in the denominator). The first one
represents firms’ deficits and says that, everything else kept constant, their indebtedness is
positively related to the investment share and negatively to internal funds. The second difference
shows that positive values for firms’ indebtedness require that gEw > i(1− ρ), or that economic
growth is higher than interest payments firms realize to banks.
Equation (2.46) is not straightforward on how firms’ indebtedness reacts to a positive shock
on gEw because an increase in this variable (in the denominator) also increases h (in the numer-
ator), so we cannot know a priori the final net effect on l∗f . If we assume, as we have done based
on the supermultiplier mechanisms, that the capital stock varies relatively more than (firms’)
debt, then it is possible to conclude that a rise in h diminishes firms’ debt to capital ratio,
allowing us to relate inversely firms’ indebtedness and investment share.
However, as previously analyzed, a rise in h increases firms’ deficits, for investments vary
relatively more than retained profits. Thus, it is straightforward that, in our model, deficits
and firms’ indebtedness are inversely related. This is another counter intuitive result: higher
deficits increase firms’ debt but decrease their indebtedness.
We have discussed all necessary features in order to have a complete story about the rela-
tionship between financial balances and the investment share, that goes as follows. A permanent
change in the growth rate of the economy necessarily begins with workers financing more con-
sumption out of credit. The rise in workers’ consumption impacts positively economic activity,
and as firms perceive the new trend in aggregate demand, they increase investments through
changes in h. The rise in the investment share reinforces economic expansion because it in-
creases the supermultiplier. The increase in investment increases firms’ deficits (even though
retained profits also increase during economic expansion), and consequently, firms’ debt. Firms’
indebtedness, however, decreases because average capital stock growth rate is higher than firms’
debt growth rate during the adjustment of productive capacity to demand.
Higher deficits accumulated by firms allow workers to save more, and they use these funds
to pay a share of their debt and to buy more financial assets (deposits). After the economy
is fully adjusted, workers find themselves accumulating more assets and liabilities. As argued
before, we assume that workers’ net worth is positive, and in the steady state not only their net
worth is higher than that in the initial state, but the net worth normalized by the capital stock.
Two more points before we conclude this section. The first one is that in our model, the
initial expansion in economic activity is strongly based on the increase of workers’ and firms’
debt stock. And since L = D (in banks’ column, in the balance sheet matrix), deposits increase
as a logical consequence of increased liabilities. The second point, related to the first one, is
that the adjustment of the investment share when gEw increases also implies in the adjustment
of the saving rate, so that I = S in each period. Investment feeds into capital stock and, in the
same way, saving feeds into the stock of deposits, through higher workers’ and rentiers’ income.
Thus, we stress that adjustments in the investment share impacts not only the stock of capital,
but also the stock of deposits.
debt following positive shocks on gEw .
5An increase in gEw diminishes l
∗
w and d
∗
w because the stock of capital varies relatively more than stocks of
debt and deposits. However, the ratio workers’ net worth to capital (NWw/K) varies positively after a positive
shock in gEw due to a higher variation of (∆Dw −∆Lw) relatively to the steady-state capital stock.
60
3.2 Simulations
As discussed, in supermultiplier models with one autonomous component, workers’ indebt-
edness may never be an issue because in the steady-state wages grow at the same rate as debt
grows, given by the growth rate of Ew, differently from some neo-Kaleckian models (Dutt, 2006;
Hein, 2011). In Pariboni (2016) and Fagundes (2017), an increase in debt-financed consumption
(gEw) actually decreases workers’ indebtedness due to the adjustment of productive capacity to
demand. A positive shock on i makes workers more indebted.
Additionally, in Fagundes (2017) the condition g > i for growth stability does not need to
stand due to the inclusion of amortization payments in the model. The conditions for sustainable
debt in Fagundes’ (2017) model are i) gEw ≥ −r and ii) Ew < (r + i)Lw.
Our main objective is to evaluate whether the main results of Pariboni (2016) and Fagundes
(2017) stand in a model that allow dynamic analysis far from the steady-state equilibriums,
after shocks in the growth rate of the autonomous component and in the interest rate. We
also assess if debt sustainability depends on the condition g > i established by Hein (2011)
and Barba and Pivetti (2009). Other simulation experiments are: a shock on gEw to evaluate
the effects on firms’ indebtedness (subsection 3.2.2), and a shock on the marginal propensity
to consume of rentiers to comprehend the implications on financial balances (subsection 3.2.3).
So far, these last two experiments have not been attempted by supermultiplier models with
autonomous consumption.
Since we cannot solve the system of four equations in section 2.4.2 to comprehend the global
dynamics of the model at each period, we make use of i) the analytical solution in section 2.4.3
to realize static analysis (table 3.1) and ii) simulation experiments that allow us to comprehend
the dynamics from one steady state to the other. We use four different scenarios6, with different
parameters and initial values. Our objectives are to evaluate whether results in the literature
stand within different combinations of parameters values and to evaluate effects on firms and
rentiers. Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 have different initial values for workers’ indebtedness. In scenarios
1 and 2 (with similar parameters values) the main difference is that in the first one gEw > i,
and in the second gEw < i. Parameters and initial values of scenario 3 were chosen so we can
generate increasing indebtedness of firms. In all scenarios workers accumulate surplus, except
in scenario 4, where workers accumulate deficits, specially due to relatively higher cw and lower
cr.
Table 3.1: Steady-state ratios before and after exogenous shocks in parameters
Ratios (shocks)/Scenarios Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
lw (gEw) 0.265 → 0.215 0.375 → 0.276 0.414 → 0.364
lw (i) 0.265 → 0.234 0.422 → 0.444
lf (gEw) 1.176 → 1.166 0.583 → 0.614
fbw (cr)
fbf (cr)
0.112 → 0.083
-0.973 → -1.000
Simulation experiments confirm that workers’ indebtedness falls after increases in the growth
rate of Ew, even though indebtedness may increase for a very brief moment after the exogenous
shock, reaching the same conclusions of Pariboni (2016) and Fagundes (2017). We also demon-
strate that condition g > i does not need to stand for debt to be sustainable - even when the
6Parameters and initial values in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.1: Effects of an increase in gEw on workers’ indebtedness
(a) Scenario 1 (b) Scenario 2
(c) Scenario 3
amortization rate is null. Moreover, the effect of changes in the interest rate on indebtedness
is ambiguous, depending on the values for marginal propensities to consume of workers and
rentiers, and on indebtedness of workers and firms. In this case, we conclude differently from
Fagundes (2017), where exogenous shocks on i only increase workers’ indebtedness. Addition-
ally, shocks on gEw may have positive or negative impacts on firms’ indebtedness, depending
on the values of the firms’ propensity to invest (h) and on the supermultiplier. Lastly, positive
shocks on cr improve rentiers’ financial balance at the expense of workers’ and firms’. These
last experiments are not realized by the supermultiplier literature for it has not explicitly taken
into account firms’ or rentiers’ financial balances.
3.2.1 Effects of shocks on gEw and i on workers’ indebtedness
To evaluate the effects of higher consumption financed out of credit in the short and long-
run economic activity, we use scenarios 1, 2 and 3. Each one contains different initial values for
indebtedness of workers. A plausible hypothesis is that the lower the indebtedness, the longer
would be the expansion effects of the increase in gEw on economic activity.
As anticipated, simulation results reveal that increases in debt-financed consumption in-
creases workers’ indebtedness only right after the shock - subsequently, the ratio Lw/K de-
creases, independently of its initial value (figures 3.1a, 3.1b and 3.1c), even in the long run.
The reason was already stressed above: capital stock grows faster than workers’ debt during
almost the entire adjustment process of productive capacity to demand. While workers’ debt
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rapidly starts to grow at the new growth rate of Ew
7, capital stock quickly responds to changes
in the investment growth rate, and as a consequence, gk > gEw . Therefore, higher workers’
indebtedness as a consequence of increased consumption financed out of credit is not achieved
in our model.
From figure 3.1 we also observe that traverses are similar in all scenarios, implying that
investment responses to shocks in gEw are similar as well.
This counter intuitive result, known in the literature as the “paradox of debt” (Hein, 2011),
is also reproduced by neo-Kaleckian models, but while they restrict such cases to specific pa-
rameters and initial values, our supermultiplier model always generates this paradox because
debt only grows more than the capital stock immediately after the shock8, and independently
of the initial value of workers’ indebtedness.
As indicated in the beginning of the section, our results are in accordance with Pariboni’s
(2016) and Fagundes’ (2017), despite the fact that we include rentiers’ consumption and firms’
debt. In this particular case, adding these variables does not modify the main conclusion because
workers’ indebtedness basically depends on an exogenous variable (gEw) at the numerator, and
on the investment function (and its impact on the stock of capital) at the denominator. Things
may be different if, say, we included another autonomous component in the model. As Pariboni
(2016) and Fagundes (2017) argue, in that case the trajectory of workers’ debt would also
depend on the rate of growth of, say, public expenditure or exports: if consumption financed
out of credit grows more rapidly than the other autonomous component, workers’ indebtedness
would increase (at least temporarily) because debt would increase faster than total autonomous
component of demand.
Another possibility would be if banks could restrain the amount of credit they give to firms,
and it is likely that investment would not respond in the same magnitude. In the case of
workers, a credit crunch would diminish debt-financed consumption and workers’ indebtedness
would increase - in other words, the paradox of debt would remain. But these possibilities would
demand more active banks in the model.
We have also evaluated whether conditions such as in Barba and Pivetti (2009) and Hein
(2011) need to hold to generate sustainable debt trajectories. In scenario 1 (figure 3.1a), gEw > i,
and in scenario 2 (figure 3.1b), gEw < i. As our results reveal, no condition relating economic
growth and borrowing costs is necessary for our model to generate a sustainable debt trajectory
- in accordance with Fagundes (2017). Both scenarios generate sustainable, decreasing workers’
indebtedness. However, in our model indebtedness is sustainable even if r = 0 - in that case,
there is a positive level effect over debt of workers, but not enough to make average growth rate
of debt higher than that of capital stock. Whereas Fagundes (2017, p. 166) argues that in his
model the condition g > i does not need to hold due to the inclusion of the amortization rate.
We also change the interest rate to evaluate the effects on workers’ indebtedness. In our
model, debt is not a function of interest rate, and shocks on i only affects workers’ indebtedness
through effects on economic activity, more specifically via redistribution of income: an increase
in i rises workers’ and firms’ interest payments, redistributed to rentiers by banks. Therefore,
changes in the interest rate may be expansionary or contractionary, depending on its relative im-
pact on consumption of workers and rentiers9. From equation (2.27) it is possible to comprehend
7Reminding that new loans Ew finance only consumption. So, the growth rate of Ew determines those of
debt and consumption, simultaneously.
8All other results are in line with the main supermultiplier features: current utilization always converges to
the normal rate, shocks on income distribution, interest and amortization rates cause only level effects.
9Although it is a common feature of SFC models that a rise in interest rate affects positively economic
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Figure 3.2: Positive effects of an increase in i (Scenario 1)
(a) Utilization rate (b) Workers’ indebtedness
the necessary condition for u to increase after a rise in i:
| − ilw−1(cw − cr)| < |ilf−1cr(1− ρ)|. (3.4)
An increase in i rises current utilization rate if rentiers’ increased consumption due to workers’
and firms’ interest payments is larger than diminished consumption (caused by lower rentiers’
propensity to consume) due to workers’ interest payments. This result depends essentially on
the difference between workers’ and rentiers’ propensity to consume and the indebtedness of
workers and firms.
In scenario 1 (figure 3.2), an increase in interest rate has positive effects on economic activity.
At first, rising i immediately rises utilization rate (figure 3.2a). The initial expansion in economic
activity is caused by the increase in rentiers’ consumption, which more than compensates the
fall in workers’ consumption. The expansionary effect on the utilization rate increases firms’
propensity to invest and reinforces this expansion. So, following the shock on i, the ratio Lw/K
falls due to faster accumulation rate (figure 3.2b).
But after this fall, indebtedness increases and stabilizes at a lower value in comparison to the
initial steady state. Transient increase of ratio Lw/K is due to two movements that rapidly bring
u down, below un (figure 3.2a): the decrease in workers’ consumption due to the lower disposable
income, and the posterior adjustment of productive capacity. The fact that current utilization
rate falls below the normal rate is relevant because it makes the growth rate of capital stock to
be lower than the growth rate of workers’ debt, increasing indebtedness of workers (figure 3.2b).
In scenario 4 (figure 3.3a) - the only one where workers accumulate deficits - a change in the
interest rate causes utilization rate to fall right after the shock. The opposite effect on u is due
to i) higher workers’ propensity to consume and lower rentiers’ propensity, and ii) higher debt
of workers compared to debt in scenario 1. Contrarily to scenario 1, here the negative effect
on workers’ consumption more than compensates the positive effect on rentiers’ consumption.
As a consequence, investment falls and the growth rate of capital stock decreases below gEw ,
increasing workers’ indebtedness (figure 3.3b). However, as the adjustment of capacity takes
place and workers’ consumption increases again, current utilization rate rises above un, rising
gk above gEw and diminishing indebtedness of workers. Final steady-state ratio Lw/K is still
activity. That is so when models (such as ours) assume that banks’ or firms’ distributed profits determine
someone’s income and, consequently, consumption.
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Figure 3.3: Negative effects of an increase in i (Scenario 4)
(a) Utilization rate (b) Workers’ indebtedness
higher than the initial one10.
As we argued, results concerning changes in the interest rate are different from Fagundes’
(2017) results. The main reason is that in our model workers’ and firms’ interest payments are
redistributed to rentiers, who use a share of them to consume. Therefore, the net effect of a
rise in interest rate on economic activity and, consequently, on indebtedness, depends mainly
on the marginal propensities to consume of workers and rentiers and on the debt-to-capital
ratios of workers and firms. For these reasons, disregarding these features prevents a complete
comprehension of the effects of shocks in the interest rate.
3.2.2 Effects of shocks on gEw on firms’ indebtedness
In scenarios 1, 2 and 4 a shock on gEw reduces firms’ indebtedness (Lf/K) because capital
stock increases relatively more than debt (figure 3.4a), as in the workers’ case. In scenario 3,
however, an increase in the growth rate of consumption financed by consumer credit actually
increases the ratio Lf/K in the steady state (figure 3.4b). Supermultiplier models with workers’
debt have not evaluated the effects of higher debt-financed consumption on firms’ debt.
In scenario 3 a positive shock on gEw increases firms’ indebtedness. The difference between
the scenarios is that firms’ deficits are higher in scenario 3 compared to the deficits in scenario
1 and 2. There are two reasons for this. The first is that firms’ propensity to invest is higher
because the values of v (technical ratio) and δ (depreciation rate) are relatively higher (equation
2.30). Therefore, a shock on gEw forces firms to invest even more. Additionally, retained profits
reach a lower growth rate in comparison to scenario 1, implying a lower average growth rate11.
This is explained by the lower multiplier in scenario 3 (8,25, and 15,62 in scenario 1), preventing
income (and profits) to grow proportionally to investment. Thus, a higher propensity to invest
associated with lower income multiplier increases relatively more Lf than K, and so firms find
themselves more indebted in the steady state.
Figure 3.4 indicates that in both scenarios the periods for the adjustment of firms’ indebt-
edness to the new steady states are quite similar.
We stress that the literature does not pay particular attention to the effects of higher debt-
10Despite the negative saving, workers still buy financial assets because funds available (a share sw of disposable
income less amortization) remain positive (equation 2.10).
11Note that pi and ρ are higher in scenario 3, but still not enough to prevent deficit to increase.
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Figure 3.4: Effects of an increase in gEw on firms’ indebtedness
(a) Scenario 1 (b) Scenario 3
financed consumption on firms’ financial balances and net worth. It is clear from these simu-
lations the importance of taking into account the interrelations between sectoral budget con-
straints.
3.2.3 Effects of increased rentiers’ propensity to consume
In our model, rentiers’ consumption is totally induced. It implies that a change in workers’
financial balance (due to shocks on gEw) does not affect rentiers’ ratio financial balance to
income. We represent this by writing it as Yr−crYr
Yr
(in which Yr − crYr = SAVr). As this
equation indicates, only changes in rentiers’ marginal propensity to consume alter this ratio
and, consequently, that of workers and firms. In other words, shocks on other parameters affect
only workers’ and firms’ financial balances. The focus of the next simulations rests on the effects
of shocks on rentiers’ marginal propensity to consume.
Sectoral financial balances indicate that an increase in the propensity to save of rentiers
impact negatively workers and firms (figures 3.5a, 3.5b and 3.5c), mainly because of the overall
negative effects on economic activity (figure 3.6a). An increase of marginal propensity to save
of rentiers allows them to accumulate more financial assets in the new steady state. Reminding
that loans are granted at the same rate, workers’ deposits necessarily have to fall to guarantee
that L = D in each period. Workers buy less financial assets because their income has fallen.
The effect on workers’ indebtedness is similar to the effects of shocks on the interest rate, where
initially the ratio Lw/K increases and then falls, but still remains above the initial ratio.
Firms’ indebtedness is equal in the new steady state (figure 3.6b). It initially increases
because the growth rate of capital stock decreases relatively more than debt stock (that falls
as a consequence of firms’ lower deficits, since h has fallen). The subsequent increase in the
capacity utilization rate brings down the ratio Lf/K, until it stabilizes again at the same initial
value.
We may say that the increase of rentiers’ deposits is only possible at the expense of workers
and firms situations, that have their ratio financial balance to income negatively affected due
to contractionary effects following the increase in cr.
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Figure 3.5: Effects of a decrease in cr on the financial balance-to-income ratio
(a) Workers (b) Rentiers
(c) Firms
Figure 3.6: Effects of a decrease in cr on current utilization rate and firms’ indebtedness
(a) Current utilization rate (b) Firms’ indebtedness
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3.3 Some notes on empirical evidence and on the super-
multiplier model with debt-financed consumption
In this section we discuss an appropriate criteria to evaluate whether our supermultiplier
model reproduces one or more empirical evidence in the short and long runs with consumption
financed out of credit. We also argue in favor of the supermultiplier theoretical framework,
against some critics in the literature.
Most part of empirical studies focusing on the effects of household debt on GDP conclude
that changes in debt increase short-run growth but lowers it in longer terms (Mian et al., 2017;
Mian and Sufi, 2010; Lombardi et al., 2017; Jorda` et al., 2013). Increased debt service burden
(Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008; Juselius and Drehmann, 2015; Drehmann and Juselius, 2012) and
the higher probability of banking crisis (Drehmann and Juselius, 2012), especially when debt is
already high (IMF, 2017) support this conclusion.
However, this empirical evidence is not an appropriate criteria to evaluate whether our
supermultiplier model reproduces at least one stylized fact on the subject because virtually
all studies deal with overall debt, that includes mortgages and consumer credit (nonmortgage
debt). Mortgages have represented by far the main reason for increased household debt in
developed economies, accounting for more than 50% of total debt (IMF, 2017), but according
to Dutt (2006, p. 342), “such debts do not really represent true net liabilities because they are
balanced by housing assets”. In order to fulfill our purposes, we should gather evidence relating
nonmortgage debt and GDP. Data on this relationship, however, virtually does not exist. The
single econometric test we were able to find (IMF, 2017) shows that effects of nonmortage debt
on future GDP growth are not statistically significant.
In the absence of available data on this topic, we consider Barba and Pivetti’s (2009) con-
ditions to household debt sustainability12 reasonable and consistent with the only available
evidence13,14. And we conclude that some neo-Kaleckian models have reproduced results that
respect Barba and Pivetti’s (2009) conditions - such as Dutt’s (2006) and Hein’s (2011) models
-, while so far supermultiplier models have not15. We believe there are some reasons that might
explain this result.
One of them is that the autonomous component of demand is exogenous and grows at a
constant rate. And as we demonstrated, it does not allow Ew to grow faster than income or the
capital stock during the adjustment mechanism. Endogeneizing the autonomous component - as
done by Brochier and Macedo e Silva (2018) - may not solve this problem, because an increase in
the autonomous component growth rate will necessarily require an even higher average growth
12We remember that Barba and Pivetti (2009, p. 128) do not deal with a demand-led model, but assume that
productivity determines real wages: “the growth of wage earners’ debt is generated by the fact that their real
wages do not rise, or their rise does not keep pace with productivity.”
13Serrano and Summa (2015) also use Barba and Pivetti’s (2009) condition to evaluate the Brazilian experience
between 2011 and 2014. They assert that between 2004 and 2010 interest rates on credit were higher than real
disposable income, preventing the continuous increase of consumption financed by credit.
14On the other hand, there is a recent literature testing statistically the relevance of autonomous components of
demand to economic growth. Dealing with data for the US economy, Girardi and Pariboni (2016) have found that
autonomous components jointly considered (sum of exports, government expenditure and household consumption
financed out of consumer credit or accumulated wealth) and output growth rates are “strongly correlated”. They
define autonomous consumption as consumption financed by consumer credit and house construction financed
by residential mortgage debt. Their estimations show that consumer credit is not autonomous in the short nor
in the long run.
15Independently of the proxy used, either Lw/K or Lw/ωY (if Lw grows at an exogenous rate).
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rate of investment and capital stock, so that capacity adjusts to the new trend of demand.
What if the model was relatively more complex including, for example, a government sector
or giving banks a more active role? If we included a threshold for workers’ indebtedness, banks
would diminish the amount of loans they grant to workers if indebtedness rose above a certain
rate. But notice that, in our model workers’ indebtedness never increase after banks increase the
supply of loans, implying that the threshold would never be reached. The only possibility for
the threshold to be triggered would be if gEw decreased, leading to a decrease in the ratio Lw/K.
But this hypothetical case does not make much sense, given that in the case of diminished Ew
banks are already granting less loans to workers.
In the case of adding a government sector in our model, financial balances could change,
with firms accumulating surplus, given that government would have deficits and, consequently,
a debt stock. But this inclusion would not change the productive adjustment process.
We are led to conclude that, so far, supermultiplier models with debt-financed consumption
have not appropriately represented trajectories of household debt because they are unable to
represent indebtedness issues with increasing consumption financed out of credit16 (either in
the short or in the long run) within reasonable ranges of parameters17. Therefore, if Freitas
and Serrano’s (2015) suggestion that “research efforts should focus on the determinants and
dynamics of (particularly financial) of the trend of growth of different autonomous components”
is to be followed, we believe some theoretical issues must be addressed. We comment some of
them in the conclusions.
A few comments on the supermultiplier and on autonomous component of demand are
necessary. Despite the limitations of our supermultiplier to represent workers’ indebtedness, we
believe it is premature to argue that the “supermultiplier model is inherently unable to be used
for the analysis of debt and financial crises in any meaningful way”, as done by Nikiforos (2018,
p. 15)18, that justifies his position arguing that the representation of financial crises requires
that the autonomous, debt-financed, expenditure cannot be autonomous in the long run.
We believe Nikiforos (2018) has confused the terms “autonomous” (that is not related to the
current level of output resulting from firms’ production decisions (Freitas and Serrano, 2015))
and “exogenous” (that is not affected by other variables). He argues that, according to the
supermultiplier theory, when the ratio debt to income grows - either because gEw increases or
the income distribution changes -, income grows so to stabilize this ratio. Nikiforos (2018)
disagrees with this mechanism arguing that in reality it does not happen like this, and explains
that when the ratio debt to income grows, it is more likely that either saving increases or
that, at some point, loans stop being granted by banks. He finishes saying “Thus, autonomous
16Decreasing indebtedness coexisting with higher deficits of one sector also occur in other models with govern-
ment expenditures as the autonomous component leading economic growth. In Dutt’s (2016) model an increase
in the autonomous government expenditures decreases the ratio debt to capital in the long run. Hein (2018)
describes the “paradox of debt”, that is the case when an increase in the growth rate of government expenditure
causes the fall in the debt-to-capital ratio (conditioned to higher initial value of this ratio). The condition to
stable debt-to-capital ratio in the long run is if the rate of growth of the government expenditures is higher
than the interest rate on government debt - in the short and medium runs, however, this ratio is held constant.
In Allain (2015) there is not government debt because its budget deficit is balanced by endogenous tax rate.
However, as Barba and Pivetti (2009, p. 127) argue, there is an important difference between household and
public debt: “whilst in the case of public debt the rate of growth of total income is not exogenous with respect
to the dynamic of the debt, in the case of indebted households the course of their incomes must be regarded as
independent of the course of their debts”.
17Even though our model allows for increased indebtedness of firms.
18Although we agree with him that “Any analysis of financial crises requires the endogeneity of ‘autonomous’
debt-financed expenditure” (Nikiforos, 2018, p. 15), as we have argued before.
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expenditure stops being autonomous” (Nikiforos, 2018).
We believe Nikiforos (2018) meant that autonomous expenditure stops being exogenous
because i) the adjustment suggested by Nikiforos (2018) requires a decrease of the autonomous
component growth rate, and the different rates at which it might grow is more related to
the fact that it is exogenous (and constant, in these cases), than that it is autonomous to
income, and ii) it would not make much sense to argue that the autonomous expenditure only
becomes induced when debt-to-income ratio grows above a certain ratio - why it was not induced
before19? Additionally, nothing prevents one to endogeneize the autonomous component of
demand - so far only done by Brochier and Macedo e Silva (2018). And finally, literature on
the supermultiplier is recent, and alternative versions of the model - with an endogenous or
two autonomous components, or more complex financial frameworks - have just began to be
explored. Therefore, there are sufficient reasons to believe that it is too soon to discard the
supermultiplier as a theoretical alternative to describe financial crises20.
Neither we believe consumption financed out of credit, an autonomous component of demand,
may be autonomous forever. Assuming long-run autonomous, exogenous demand is a theoretical
feature used in supermultiplier models, not a statement on reality. Skott (2017) and Nikiforos
(2018), however, seem to believe that sraffians and supporters of supermultiplier models accept
that, indeed, autonomous demand is fully autonomous in the long run21. We agree that basic
consumption cannot be autonomous in longer terms. Additionally, we are aware that banks
desire to provide loans depends, in some extent, on some workers’ income indicators. Real life
is always much more complex than theory, an that is why we agree with Edmond Malinvaud
(apud Lavoie (2017)) that argued that models such as ours are prototypes, “as they leave aside
several key determinants of economic activity and abstract from the world complexity”. More
complex models are capable of incorporating Skott’s claims.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have explored all implications of our model making use of intuitive descrip-
tion and computer simulations, that explore dynamics far from the steady state. We phrased
supermultiplier dynamics through sectoral financial balances, a fundamental feature to explain
how stocks evolve over time.
Simulation experiments confirm, following Pariboni’s (2016) and Fagundes’ (2017) results,
that an increase in workers’ consumption financed out of credit increases their indebtedness only
right after the shock, independently of their initial financial situation and of the relative sizes of
19There are other passages that demonstrate a certain confusion of Nikiforos (2018, p. 15). After have
explained his point, he summarizes saying “This is the deeper reason why debt-financed expenditure cannot be
autonomous in the long run and why income and other economic variable have influence on all expenditures
decisions”, and right after this statement, Nikiforos completes, “In the long run, expenditure decisions become
endogenous in order to stabilize the debt-to-income ratio”. It is not easy to tell for sure if Nikiforos is talking
about exogeneity/endogeneity or autonomy/inducement - or both of them. Nikiforos expects some mechanisms
that simple supermultiplier models - with exogenous autonomous component and passive banks - were not built
to provide. As Skott (2017, p. 3) argues, “A model that has been designed to explore a particular mechanism
cannot predict or fully explain real-world outcomes that are influenced by many other mechanisms”.
20Another alternative is to use the supermultiplier in the short and medium runs, before the adjustment of
productive capacity is complete.
21For example, Skott (2017, p. 5-6) asserts that “Basic consumption, on other words, is not autonomous from
a medium and a long-run perspective”, or “the notion that residential investment is autonomous and grows at
the natural rate does not meet simple behavioral and empirical tests”.
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gEw and i. After this initial effect, indebtedness falls even in the long run. Shocks on the interest
rate have ambiguous impacts in economic activity, depending on the marginal propensities to
consume of workers and rentiers and their indebtedness.
We have demonstrated that in the firms’ case indebtedness may rise as an effect of changes in
the financial balance of another agent. Scenario 3 allows that firms’ indebtedness increases after
a positive shock on gEw , a result of simultaneous higher propensity to invest and lower multiplier.
This outcome indicates that we should not disregard the interrelation between sectoral balance
sheets, for the change in the financial situation of an agent affects other agents.
Finally, a shock on marginal propensity to consume of rentiers is contractionary in the short
run, and the increase in financial assets acquisition is possible at the expense of workers and
firms situations, that have their ratio financial balance to income negatively affected.
The inability to reproduce at reasonable parameters values, and at any period, increased
indebtedness as a consequence of higher consumption financed out of credit is one limitation of
the model. This is due to the fact that the autonomous component grows at an exogenous, lower
growth rate than income and capital average growth rates. So far, supermultiplier models have
not allowed to risen indebtedness at all as a response to increased debt-financed consumption,
either in the short or long run.
Further research on the supermultiplier should focus on models that allow for the possibility
of increasing workers’ indebtedness as the effect of higher consumption financed by consumer
credit. In order to achieve that, the autonomous component of demand has to grow faster than
income or the stock of capital for a while. Including another autonomous component and en-
dogeneizing the existing one may be alternatives, and it necessarily implies a more active role
for banks. Also, changes in the investment function can prevent income and capital stock to
respond immediately after exogenous shocks on the autonomous component. Finally, substitut-
ing the normal utilization rate for a range (Brochier and Macedo e Silva, 2018) can certainly
impede investment to respond to any shock on gEw . This research agenda is imperative if su-
permultiplier models are intended to replicate and explain common phenomena as consumer
restraint and credit rationing.
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Conclusions
The subject of this thesis is the financing of investment and consumption. Interestingly,
in the chapter on financing of investment, finance is a potential restraint to investment (given
current conditions in the Brazilian economy), but in the chapter on the supermultiplier SFC
model, finance enables autonomous consumption, that leads the economic growth process with-
out restrictions caused by higher workers’ indebtedness. We make some comments on the results
achieved, trying to link them at the end.
As argued in chapter 1, in a scenario that combines scarcity of the frequently used funds and
a serious issue on balance sheets caused by increased foreign debt, it seems plausible to assert
that companies in Brazil may find more difficult to increase investment whenever Brazilian
economy recovers.
According to our econometric model, retained profits and BNDES’ loans (direct and indirect
non automatic operations) were the main sources of finance for the companies in our sample.
The importance of BNDES’ operations is even greater if our estimates on negative retained
profits are correct.
We reiterate that our knowledge is little about the way companies manage assets and liabili-
ties to finance investment, and why they choose the funds they normally recur to. Comprehend-
ing these questions is fundamental, for the answers may lead to relevant public policies, such as
the development of financial markets in Brazil, or in the recovery of BNDES’ operations. We
suggest that a promising research agenda may be the study of sectoral finance of investment, for
sectors have different specificities - concerning, for example, number of companies, their average
sizes and sectoral profits - and, therefore, different access to internal and external funds.
In chapters 2 and 3, we demonstrated that in our supermultiplier SFC model, workers’
indebtedness does not constrain economic growth because consumption financed out of credit
affects relatively more output and income than workers’ debt. One of the main reasons is that
investment (and capital stock) reacts, in average, more to an increase in the growth rate of the
autonomous component of demand than debt does.
Even though we have tested different combinations of parameters and initial values, it was not
possible to reproduce lasting increases in workers’ indebtedness after increases in autonomous
consumption. We conclude that if supermultiplier models are intended to replicate phenomena
as consumer restraint and credit rationing, while preserving its main features, it is imperative
that they should allow for the possibility of increasing indebtedness during economic expansions.
We are aware that our model is highly stylized, and that results should be seen with pre-
caution. For example, banks have a passive role and accommodate all demand to loans from
workers and firms. As we know, this is an unrealistic representation of banks, the main re-
sponsible for most of credit supply in capitalist economies. Be that as it may, we hoped to
have demonstrated that, as it is currently specified, supermultiplier models may be inadequate
to represent empirically known facts such as indebtedness rises during faster economic growth
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processes.
That does not mean supermultiplier models should be discarded as a sound alternative to
other growth models. It is indisputable that they represent a relevant progress in heterodox
growth theory for being capable of reproducing available evidence concerning economic growth,
investment share in GDP and autonomous components of demand. Nonetheless, we believe
there is room for progress.
Improvements in the investment function could be taken into consideration, if one’s objective
is to replicate increases in indebtedness caused by faster economic growth. Financial features,
following the post-Keynesian tradition, are always a theoretical possibility, and there have been
many attempts in this sense, including interest and profit rates as determinants. But, how to
reconcile the importance of financial features in shorter terms with the plausible idea that firms
adjust productive capacity to demand in longer terms?
We believe that internal finance may be a coherent theoretical possibility that meets simul-
taneously the requirements of those demands for the inclusion of financial features in investment
functions, and those advocating in favor of the adjustment of productive capacity to demand
as the main role of investment in the long run. Apart from being the most important source
of finance in most companies in the world (according to UNCTAD, 2016), it is plausible that
in shorter terms profits may fluctuate and eventually mismatch with investment plans of firms,
while in longer terms profits tend to be procyclical, diminishing its importance and giving
relevance to the role of adjusting productive capacity.
This suggestion has to be pondered by a few elements.
We cannot generalize the idea that financing may always be a restriction to investment.
Table 1.1 shows that, according to firms, financing is not a relevant restriction in all regions in
the world. For example, only 11,6% of all firms in developed countries, OECD members, say that
financing is a major constraint, while in Latin America and Caribbean countries this percentage
is around 30%, and in Africa and the West Asia it is almost 40%. From this evidence it is possible
to argue that financing restrictions seem to be a characteristic of economically underdeveloped
countries.
This restriction seems to be more related to the alternative funds, for firms do not control
them. It would not be exaggerated to argue that retained profits are always a permanent source
of finance (although a variable one). If this is a sound reasoning, specifying theoretically external
finance in investment functions becomes even more difficult, because financing would depend
on the banking system or on public banks.
There are other obstacles if one intends to model an investment function respecting some
characteristics of open and underdeveloped countries. In the Brazilian economy, where a relevant
share of equipment and machinery is imported, the proportion of profits and investment might
be relatively lower. In this scenario, internal finance may also become an important restriction
even during expansions in aggregate investment.
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Appendix
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
gEw 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06
i 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05
r 0.15 0.15 0.2 0.1
cw 0.82 0.82 0.8 0.9
cr 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5
pi 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5
ω 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5
γ 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
ρ 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.9
v 2 2 2.3 2.5
δ 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02
h 0.175 0.175 0.26 0.25
un 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Dw 98.05 110.25 45.36 16.12
Dr 46.06 72.7 54.45 142.42
Dt 144.11 182.95 99.81 158.54
Lw 26.46 37.5 41.43 42.18
Lf 117.65 145.45 58.38 116.36
Lt 144.11 182.95 99.81 158.54
K 100 100 100 100
Ew 5.04 6.85 9.86 6.37
